y this identical world have no mental capacity or life at all. As there is something about us that gives us mental capacity that they lack, physicalism must be false because there is more to us than the purely physical.

Although the Modal Argument and the What it is Like Argument are substantial, the depth of Jackson’s argument against physicalism primarily relies on the Knowledge Argument. In order to prevent confusion, Jackson clarifies three things regarding the Knowledge Argument and Mary.

• First, the argument does not claim that you cannot imagine what it is like to see red. Thus, the argument does not rely on the position that Mary cannot imagine what it is like to see red, but that Mary cannot truly know what it is like to see red until she has seen red. She can imagine endlessly, but the knowledge is not there. Jackson claims that “imagination is a faculty that those who lack knowledge need to fall back on” (Jackson).
• Second, Jackson argues that Mary’s learning of the experience of seeing the color red did not rely on logical inferences. After leaving the black and white room and seeing the color red, Mary does not claim that she could have had knowledge of seeing the color red without leaving the room if she could have used more logical inferences while in the room.
• Third, Jackson reiterates that Mary lacked information about the experience of others. Jackson refers to the lack of information as a problem for physicalists because Mary realizes her conception of others’ mental life has been “impoverished” through her existence. Although she knew the physical facts the entire time, she did not have all the information regarding their experiences. Therefore, physicalism is compromised even further.

There are some philosophers who do not necessarily align with Jackson’s perspective. David Lewis has the strongest objection to Jackson’s qualia position. Lewis shapes his objection to Jackson using the Ability Hypothesis and the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information. Lewis argues that Mary leaves the black and white room, she learns she has the ability to know what seeing red is like. Thus, Mary is becoming aware of abilities, not learning new information. That is, Mary learns the ability to see red. Lewis uses the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information to argue that the new information Mary receives when viewing red is in fact phenomenal information. Lewis’ point relies on the fact that Mary already knows “know-that” information, and that the experience teaches her “know-how” information, which is phenomenal. By learning the “know-how” information, Mary is able to re