Furthermore, Klein describes pain and its relationship to suffering, which is of interest for this paper. Klein makes a point that because pains are unpleasant, it is generally acknowledged that people go out of their way to avoid them and get rid of them when they arise. Because hurt is a feature of pains both emotional and physical, it is often assumed that it must be an always occurring property of pain. Klein then offers four arguments to distinguish between pain and suffering. The first argument, he claims is also the simplest. He claims that pain and hurt come apart, and calls this the argument from dissociation. He explains that some pains don’t hurt, and many things that hurt aren’t pains. Klein gives example after example of pains that do not hurt, and hurts that do not stem from pain, but instead just motivate the bearer to move them self or take initiative to use their power to fix the pain. The next argument he presents is the argument from independent variation. Before he delves into the argument, he reminds readers that the question trying to be answered is whether pain and suffering should be distinguished as separate phenomena, not whether pain can occur without suffering. He returns to the argument, stating that pain and suffering are able to independently vary from one another in their intensity. Simply stated, something can hurt intensely but not cause suffering or hurt mildly but bring intense suffering. He claims that this is solid evidence for his view that proposes pain intensity alone is part of pain, while suffering is a secondary characteristic. His third argument is what he calls the argument from differing domains. In it, he attempts to distinguish between pain and hurt. He states that all things that hurt don’t deserve the title of pain and continues to arg