possible that potential jurors read these stories and agreed also. The judge did not, however, feel that recklessness was enough to create a serious risk of prejudice to the trial. Recklessness could only amount to the risk of interference with the court of justice. Watkins LJ, lastly, stated that ‘the circumstances in which a criminal contempt at common law can be committed are not necessarily… confined to those in which proceedings are either pending or imminent.’ Common law was a ‘lively body of law capable of adaption and expansion to meet fresh needs calling for the exertion of the discipline of law.’ In AG v Sport Newspapers Bingham LJ followed Watkins LJ ruling by reiterating that if there is a risk and intention, as mentioned before, there can still be contempt even if the proceedings are neither in existence nor imminent.

In AG v Punch the House of Lord concluded that the editor of Punch had committed contempt of court by publishing a story about the Bishopsgate bomb, written by a former Security Service member, who was not allowed to disclose any information about his work at the Security Service due to an interlocutory injunction. It has been argued that this decision has failed to ‘give due weight to the interest of freedom of expression and media freedom.’ The house of Lords failed to investigate the proportionality of the restrictions imposed by the common law contempt on these rights, simply due to the fact that the publication was intended to ‘frustrate the purpose of an earlier court order to keep such information confidential pending a full trial.’ There was no examination of the public interest in the revelation of the information. It has been suggested that ‘the decision in Punch suggests t