Leadership and communication

at
Categories
Tags

Select
a conversation where you had a disagreement that had an impact on you
and triggered a bioreaction. The conversation could have been a long
time ago or recently.

A. Explain what happened during the disagreement by answering the following questions:
• Describe the situation that led to the conversation.
• When did you realize that there was a disagreement during the conversation?
• Describe a bioreaction(s) that was experienced during the disagreement.
• How did the conversation end?

B. Analyze the conversation by answering the following questions:
•
Using the four levels of the conversation meter, what level were you
listening at, and what level was the other person listening at?
•
Give examples of two factors that describe how you and they were
listening in at these levels in the conversation meter: feelings,
behaviors, language, or tone.
• What were your points of alignment or disagreement?

C. Reflect on how the conversation encouraged you to listen differently by answering the following questions:
•
How could you have listened differently moving up the conversation
meter, and what effect would that have had on the disagreement?

 

Sample Solution

y and maximise on savings. Paradoxically, a similar concept in service provision carries a ‘loyalty penalty’ for British consumers, who are losing out on £4bn a year (CMA, 2018). Firms exploit uninformed customers, by discriminating between them. Contrastingly, naïve consumers become complacent and blindly trust their current suppliers, whilst those that may be aware of such practises are deterred away by high search or switching costs.

In an environment where consumers are loyal, hence have an inelastic demand, or are simply uninformed, due to the presence of search costs, firms can choose to employ second and third-degree price discrimination. For example, British Gas offers a range of tariffs dependent on your needs, location etc. for electricity usage.

I illustrate how firms manipulate prices by adopting the Stahl-Varian model. We can change the assumptions from the original model so that the informed customers, I, are new customers, and the uninformed customers, M, are old customers. Thus, the uninformed customers will have a search cost, c, if they look for cheaper service providers. The other assumptions remain the same; all consumers have the same reservation price, r, and there are n symmetric firms in the market.

The number of old (uninformed) customers per firm, U, is exogenously given by:

Firms choose prices between p*, which equals to the marginal cost, and r. Informed customers have knowledge of prices provided by firms, thus, they will only buy from the cheapest firm.

The firm will sell to I with probability:

The firm will sell to M with probability:

Therefore, the firm’s expected profits are given by:

In a competitive market, firms behave in a way to maximise profits. Gamble et al., (2013), suggest firms are cognizant of customer costs; they recognise when customers are likely to switch. In this case, they will lower their price so that the price difference between theirs and rival prices is less than the search and switching costs, thereby stopping customers from switching.

The firm sets prices to maximises profits:

The derivative helps us find the profit maximisation pr

This question has been answered.

Get Answer