use words, or put together signs, as we do in order to declare our thoughts’ (Study Guide:105). Although he states in Discourse on a Method that machines can ‘[utter] words’ (Study Guide:105), they would never be able to do it in the manner as we do. Their responses would lack ‘appropriately meaningful [answers]’ (Study Guide:105) if they deviated from the arrangements programmed into them. No matter how effectively machines mimic human behaviour, only an immaterial thinking substance (our mind) could participate in the flexible use of language by responding appropriately to unforeseen circumstances. Human speech is a non-mechanical action, and no matter how complex the programming of a machine, their replies would be directed by rules.
The second rule is focused on reason and common sense. Even though machines can behave the same way as humans do, they would not be acting from ‘understanding but only from the disposition of their organs’ whereas reason is our ‘universal instrument’ (Study Guide:105). This second method suggests that they would be mimicking human behaviour in a restricted number of ways; there is not enough space for organs to fit inside a machine to give it the ability to reason through every unpredictable event the machine was to encounter. People, on the other hand, can partake in conversations on topics they know nothing about, but still create meaningful replies. Hence, it is impossible for machines to act to the same capability that reason allows us to.
Fast forward to the 20th century and the Turing Test challenges Descartes’ views. First of all, I will examine his functionalism definition of ‘thinking’. The mind is akin to a computer program with inputs (i.e. sensory information, such as touching a hot pan) and outputs (i.e. reactions, such as moving the hand away from the pan in pain). Thinking is just a computational process (Study Guide:112). This contrasts to Descartes as thinking is defined by consciousness and an immaterial mind.
According to Turing, the test is an indicator of artificial intelligence. The human interrogator asks a computer a series of question. Through their conversation, the interrogator is to determine whether or not the other is a machine or not. If the machine’s behaviour is indistinguishable from a human and the interrogator is successfully deceived, then the computer is thinking and intelligent (Turing:128).
I will now evaluate both arguments. The Turing test is less rigorous than Descartes’ two rules. If Descartes’ obstacle to producing a reasoning machine is its inability to use language flexibly, then a machine that passes the Turing Test is sufficient in proving an object truly thinks. As long as a computer can deceive the interrogator into thinking it is a person, it passes the test. Simply passing is sufficient for thought. In contrast, the Cartesian test considers more factors than the Turing test. It tests both the machine’s language abilities and the ability to solve problems in everyday situations. Hence, I think that a machine could pass the Turing test without passing Descartes’ test by failing to
