ts citizens, and whilst regime change came as a result of necessary humanitarian intervention, the principal goal was the protection of human rights. A further argument which is made against the intervention in Libya is one which is also levelled against the concept of the R2P doctrine itself, whether it indeed unacceptably breaches a level of sovereignty. In a polemic article regarding Libyan intervention, Keeler argues “it seemed clear that for many politicians, humanitarian intervention has become no more than an inappropriate violation of national sovereignty.” (Keeler, 2011) However, the question still remains at what point does national sovereignty have to be breached to protect human rights? In this case, and in accordance with R2P it was at the point that the Libyan state had failed in its obligation to protect its citizens forcing the intervention of the International community. Collins indeed argues that “not since Rwanda had a regime signalled its intent to commit crimes against humanity so clearly.” (Collins, 2013, p302) The Libyan case could, therefore, be seen as an exceptional circumstance of extreme importance for the UN to avoid a situation which ominously resembled Rwanda. R2P, therefore, was implemented decisively to achieve its principle aim, alleviating the Libyan human rights crisis. Whilst, due to the hostilities of international politics, criticism of policy and action was inevitable, I would consider the implementation of R2P in Libya as both a positive attempt to learn from the past and a necessary breach of sovereignty.

A second case in which it is clear the UN and the international community saw it fit to implement R2P is that of the Cote D’Ivoire after its presidential elections in November 2010. This occurred after opposing candidates Gbagbo and Ouattara declared themselves, individually, winners of a shambolic election process resulting in both men establishing government in the same city of Abidjan. (ICRtoP, n.d) The ensuing violence between the forces of both Ouattara and Gbagbo created a humanitarian crisis, which was reported by the UN to have killed over 1000 people, directly forcibly displaced nearly 500,000 people and led to the fleeing of 94,000 more to neighbouring Liberia. (Ibid) The international community did not shirk their ‘Responsibility to Protect’, the mandate of the United Nations operation in Cote D’Ivoire (UNOCI) was extended by passing resolution 1962. This resolution urged all parties to accept the UN’s review suggesting Ouattara’s election victory, it also weakened Gbagbo’s power by comprehensively freezing his assets in a similar manner to the Libyan conflict. (Daddieh 2016, p151) On January 19th, 2011 the UN Security Council enhanced measures against Gbagbo by unanimously voting to send in an additional 2000 UNOCI forces into the country. Sanctions were augmented by the UN through the passing of resolution 1975 on the 30th of March 2011, which urged Gbagbo to “step aside,” and supported the UNOCI in using “all means necessary,” to protect civilian life. (UN 2011) Gbagbo was arrested in April 2011 putting an end to the conflict. The impact of R2P would seem clear here as, simply without its concept, whilst