with the international community they were able to name and shame which showed slight improvements in governments recognition of human rights. This recognition of human rights norms during this time period may correlate to the successful regime change post-Arab Spring which enabled the third stage of the model to thrive. The spiral model, therefore, provides for a useful structure for comparing the methods by which international human rights norms may or may not be established in domestic legal systems.

Jetschke and Liese (2013) explain that only a few states shift from stage four to stage five of the spiral model as it is challenging to sustain internal or external pressure on noncompliant states such as China and Indonesia. To them, the spiral model “overestimates the power of civil society actors and underestimates the cultural heterogeneity of civil society, which typically includes forces unfriendly towards human rights” (Freeman, 2017). They argue that “[h]uman rights advocates assume a causal link between governmental action and human-rights protections: if a government does not control its territory and population, this link is broken; if a government can legitimise its human rights violations, for example by claiming that there are threats to the state and/or the nation, the causal link is maintained but the violations are legitimised” (ibid; Jetschke and Liese, 2013). With the studies mentioned above that have aimed at observing states behaviour when they ratify international human rights mechanisms, we are able to see how this causal link is not certain. The spiral model seems to only conceptualise a portion of the constitutive relationship between the state and international human rights norms. It, therefore, fails to explain why recalcitrant states such as China have had such a significant influence over the enforcement mechanisms on international human rights norms. Powerful economic states like China are able to reconstitute their own international normative structure, it is, therefore, important to examine whether world position makes a difference in human rights protections and whether this has an influence on the domestic impact of human rights norms (Landman, 2005). The spiral model is unable to acknowledge the impact of the economy, and how this can impact states behavi