The Misrepresentation of Muslims in Hollywood

1) does tv/film have any effect on societal views?
2) Early Hollywood Muslim or Arab depiction
3) typical portrayal of Muslims nowadays;
I identified four common trends of Muslim characterization in Hollywood: they are for the most part impressively rich, they are barbaric and uncivilized, they are sex-driven with an affinity for white subjection, and they take pleasure in terrorism acts. The portrayal of Muslims in the last half century has evolved slightly, but their depiction revolves around these four primitive misconceptions. I would really appreciate it if you could expand on this.
4) How is this image harmful?
5) Counter-representation (who are some Muslim figures in Hollywood who have fought back against the image of Muslims in Hollywood? for example Hasan Minhaj)

Sample Solution

The September eleventh assaults made a huge difference. Residential approach adjustments were among the most huge changes after 9/11. In particular, the 2002 Ashcroft Attorney General Guidelines and the 2008 Mukasey Attorney General Guidelines were at the cutting edge of post 9/11 arrangement changes. These Attorney General Guidelines changed the way the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) explored psychological oppression in the United States notwithstanding making counterterrorism the FBI’s top need. One of the manners in which the FBI forestalls psychological warfare is using covert specialists and classified sources. How the 2002 and 2008 Attorney General Guidelines impacted the FBI’s utilization of human knowledge in fear based oppression cases stayed to be seen. This examination looked into the issue of strategy changes post 9/11 and their impact on the FBI’s utilization of covert agents in fear based oppression cases.


I. Presentation

The fear monger assaults on September 11, 2001, executed almost 3,000 individuals. During the consequence of those assaults, the media and general society searched for somebody to fault, and among the individuals who got fault, the knowledge network confronted overwhelming analysis. In the decade that followed, policymakers changed rules whereupon the knowledge network worked. The adjustments in rules were expected to help individuals from the insight network forestall fear monger assaults, for example, those that happened on September 11, from happening once more.

The knowledge network in the United States includes sixteen distinct organizations and workplaces, each dealt with by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Kaplan, 2012). Inside these sixteen organizations are six program directors who are liable for social occasion and looking at different kinds of knowledge data (Kaplan, 2012). In the midst of the administrative offices is the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As an individual from the insight network, the FBI is answerable for notice policymakers of potential dangers to the country’s security (Schalch, 2003). Additionally, the FBI is the lead expert in researching fear mongering in the United States. So as to caution policymakers of potential dangers, the FBI acquires and looks at knowledge data assembled by means of human insight, otherwise called private witnesses and covert operators.

The systems overseeing the FBI’s household analytical tasks are known as the Attorney General Guidelines. Since the assaults on September 11, 2001, there have been two changes in these rules: the 2002 John Ashcroft Attorney General Guidelines, and the 2008 Michael Mukasey Attorney General Guidelines.

The Ashcroft Guidelines extended the extent of insightful systems. After usage of the 2002 rules the FBI started working as all the more a proactive, instead of responsive organization. The 2008 Mukasey Guidelines supported the FBI’s insightful capacities by forcing less limitations (Shields, 2012).

Changes to the rules over the previous decade expanded the FBI’s capacity, however they additionally changed its capacity to utilize classified witnesses and covert operators. Scarcely any experimental examinations have dissected the FBI’s utilization of private sources and covert operators in residential psychological warfare occurrences. Of those that have, there have been a few key discoveries. To begin with, it is realized that simply over 40% of residential fear based oppression cases utilize human knowledge (Greenberg, 2011). Second, there was about a 40% drop in the utilization of witnesses and over a 25% drop in the utilization of covert operators in the prompt years following 9/11 (Shields, 2012). At long last, secret witnesses and covert specialists speak to the absolute best strategies in recognizing fear based oppressor plots and in distinguishing and capturing culprits in finished psychological militant assaults (Hewitt, 2014). Along these lines, restricted research on human insight in fear based oppression cases has demonstrated the noteworthiness of covert agents.

To all the more likely comprehend the utilization of human insight in psychological warfare a hypothetical methodology from auxiliary logical hypothesis will be utilized. Auxiliary relevant hypothesis is the possibility that segments of the equity framework regularly work self-governingly of each other and that the world of politics of the time may change ordinary criminal equity tasks to meet up to focus on a particular kind of wrongdoing and criminal for indictment (Smith and Damphousse, 1998). Previously, auxiliary relevant hypothesis has been utilized to help disclose reactions to psychological warfare as far as condemning results. Smith and Damphousse (1998) estimated that if fear mongering got the open’s consideration the equity framework would cooperate as opposed to autonomously of each other. Joint effort all through the equity framework would then restrict attentiveness among indicting and condemning fear mongers. In this way, the more genuinely fear mongering is seen by people in general, the less contrast there ought to be in condemning results in psychological warfare cases. Smith and Damphousse (1998) found about multiple times more clarified change in sentence results for fear based oppressors than nonterrorists, supporting basic logical hypothesis. Utilizing Structural Contextual Theory, this paper will inspect the utilization of secret witnesses and covert operators post-9/11 to address two research questions. The principal inquire about inquiry will look at how the Ashcroft and Mukasey Guidelines changed the utilization of classified sources and covert specialists utilized in psychological warfare cases. The subsequent research question will look at what sway, assuming any, the adjustments in the utilization of covert specialists and classified witnesses have had on case preparing and results in fear mongering cases.

As referenced, there is a deficiency in exact research on the utilization of classified witnesses and covert operators in household fear mongering cases. Earlier writing is constrained to the year 2004 concerning research on covert specialists and restricted to the year 2011 concerning research on secret sources (Shields, 2012; Greenburg, 2011). Moreover, the latest investigation (Hewitt, 2014) including human insight didn’t look at the idea of fear based oppression case results in cases with sources and covert operators. My commitments work off Shields (2012) just as Greenberg (2011) and Hewitt (2014) by expanding the time allotment of investigating human insight to 2014 and by looking at how the utilization of secret sources and covert specialists shifts across classification of fear mongering, planned objective sort and conviction rate in cases with human knowledge versus cases without human insight among different components.

Looking at classified witnesses and covert specialists through this examination will add to existing writing while additionally being socially significant. After 9/11 the FBI was reprimanded for not coming to an obvious conclusion concerning data they had that possibly could have kept the assaults from that day. One analysis was that the FBI was excessively receptive and experienced an auxiliary shortcoming (Zegart, 2007). FBI operators were prepared to be receptive, case driven, and conviction situated to explore past wrongdoings and not to forestall future ones (Zegart, 2007). Because of this analysis, Attorney General John Ashcroft changed the FBI from a receptive organization to a proactive office with his 2002 Attorney General Guidelines by supporting insightful systems. While Ashcroft changed the structure of the FBI into a proactive office, ongoing analysis has recommended that the FBI is as a rule excessively proactive, particularly through sting tasks utilizing private witnesses and covert specialists. One model originates from the 2014 HBO narrative The Newburgh Sting, which delineates a 2009 psychological oppression plot where four men were supposedly cajoled by a FBI witness to assault U.S. military planes in New York. Discoveries from the present examination might be significant for country security approach, as socially pertinent human rights issues have emerged from cases, for example, The Newburgh Sting.

This examination is set up as follows: First, I give a chronicled record of approach changes and government psychological oppression examinations. Second, I audit surviving writing on private sources and covert specialists. Third, I spread out research questions followed by a techniques segment containing theories. Fifth, I present expository outcomes lastly end with a talk.

II. Arrangement Change and Terrorism Investigations


Psychological warfare happens in basically every nation all through the world’s history, and its causes have been amazingly shifted after some time and space (Mahan and Griset, 2013). Throughout the entire existence of American psychological warfare, the Oklahoma City shelling and the assaults of 9/11 are the two occasions whereupon every other occasion are looked at (Damphousse and Shields, 2007). The Oklahoma City bombarding stirred America to the risk of local fear based oppression while 9/11 showed the danger of universal psychological oppression. The climax of these assaults carried tremendous changes to against psychological oppression strategies and the organizations that work under them.

The FBI was most impacted by these changes, given its essential duty to explore local psychological oppression. While most government and insight offices characterize fear based oppression in an unexpected way, the FBI characterizes psychological oppression as ‘the unlawful utilization of power or savagery against people or property to scare or constrain an administration, the regular citizen populace, or any fragment thereof in facilitation of political or social destinations’ (FBI, 2014). The strategies to figure out who the FBI researches, and under what conditions, are from multiple points of view, as significant as the FBI’s meaning of psychological oppression (Smith, 1994). The techniques that decide the FBI’s examinations are controlled under the ‘Lawyer General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations’ (Mukasey, 2008).

Lawyer General Edward Levi made the primary Attorney General Guidelines in 1976. Levi built up the rules as a reaction to the free discourse and security infringement revealed during