ority is given to him. This is further supported by Aristotle’s Politics ((1996), Page 28): ‘a king is the natural superior of his subjects.’ However, he does later emphasise to put all faith in the prince is wrong and has consequences; a thorough examination of the cause of war is required along with the willingness to negotiate rival party (Begby et al (2006b), Page 312& 318). This is supported by the actions of Hitler are deemed unjustly. Also, in today’s world, wars are no longer fought only by states but also non-state actors like Al-Queda and ISIS, showing Vittola’s normative claim on authority is outdated. This is further supported by Frowe’s claim that the leader needs to represent the people’s interests, under legitimate authority, which links on to the fourth condition: Public declaration of war. Agreed with many, there must be an official announcement on a declaration of war (Frowe (2011), Page 59-60&63).
Finally, the most controversial condition is that wars should have a reasonable chance of success. As Vittola reiterated, the aim of war is to establish peace and security; securing the public good. If this can’t be achieved, Frowe argues it would be better to surrender to the enemy. This can be justified because the costs of war would have been bigger (Frowe (2011), Page 56-7).
Consequently, jus ad bellum comprises several conditions but most importantly: just cause and proportionality. This gives people a guide whether it’s lawful to enter a war or not. However, this is only one part of the theory of the just war. Nevertheless, it can be seen above that jus ad bellum can be debated throughout, showing that there is no definitive theory of a just war, as it is normatively theorised.

Jus in bello

The second section begins deciphering jus in bello or what actions can we classify as permissible in just wars (Begby et al (2006b), Page 323).
First, it is never just to intentionally kill innocent people in wars, supported by Vittola’s first proposition. This is widely accepted as ‘all people have a right not to be killed’ and if a soldier does, they have violated that right and lost their right. This is further supported by “non-combatant immunity” (Frowe (2011), Page 151), which leads to the question of combatant qualification mentioned later in the essay. This is corroborated by the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, ending the Second World War, where millions were intently killed, just to secure the aim of war. However, sometimes civilians are accidentally killed through wars to achieve their goal of peace and security. This is supported by Vittola, who implies proportionality again to justify action: ‘care must be taken where evil doesn’t outweigh the possible benefits (Begby et al (2006b), Page 325).’ This is further supported by Frowe who explains it is lawful to unintentionally kill, whenever the combatant has full knowledge of his actions and seeks to complete his aim, but it would come at a cost. However, this does not hide the fact the unintended still killed innocent people, showing immorality in their actions. Thus, it depends again on proportionality as Thomson argues (Frowe (2011), Page 141).
This leads to question of what qualifies to be a combatant, and whether it is lawful to kill each other as combatants. Combatants are people who are involved directly or indirectly with the war and it is lawful to kill ‘to shelter the innocent from harm…punish evildoers (Begby et al (2006b), Page 290).However, as mentioned above civilian cannot be harmed, showing combatants as the only legitimate targets, another condition of jus in bello, as ‘we may not use the sword against those who have not harmed us (Begby et al (2006b), Page 314).’ In addition, Frowe suggested combatants must be identified as combatants, to avoid