Imagine a very moral judge deeply committed to utilitarianism. A case comes up in which an innocent (the judge knows this) person stands accused of embezzling the life savings of huge numbers of people. If the judge does not convict and harshly punish the accused, a violent crowd outside will riot and will cause enormous suffering and damage. Should the judge convict the accused, if that conviction maximizes the total pleasure (minus pain) in the world? What is to stop this judge from making a hidden exception to norms of justice on utilitarian grounds?
To begin with, who ultimately decides what qualifies as “pleasure-inducing”? Does it solely come down to personal opinion or can be there other factors taken into consideration? Such questions become even more complicated when we consider potential exceptions to usual legal standards – like punishing someone less harshly due to their age or circumstances – as these types of scenarios might require different approaches than traditional ones.
Moreover making an exception also means disregarding certain fundamental principles of justice: In order to maintain trust between citizens and law enforcement agencies, courts must uphold predetermined mandates no matter extenuating circumstances. Allowing any type of bias risk undermining people’s faith system leading them to engage more in illegal activities out of fear reprisal (Hegel, 1988).
Ultimately utilizing utilitarianism as a basis for judgment not only is dangerous but potentially unethical as well. While the idea of increasing total net benefit may sound appealing on surface, its application is much harder than anticipated since it is hard to determine appropriate course of action without sufficient data available; in addition, it should always prioritize in maintaining integrity in judicial processes over achieving outcomes regardless of situation at hand . Only then will we able to truly create fair playing field for everyone involved.
regards to the osmosis of pieces into lumps. Mill operator recognizes pieces and lumps of data, the differentiation being that a piece is comprised of various pieces of data. It is fascinating regards to the osmosis of pieces into lumps. Mill operator recognizes pieces and lumps of data, the differentiation being that a piece is comprised of various pieces of data. It is fascinating to take note of that while there is a limited ability to recall lumps of data, how much pieces in every one of those lumps can change broadly (Miller, 1956). Anyway it’s anything but a straightforward instance of having the memorable option huge pieces right away, somewhat that as each piece turns out to be more natural, it very well may be acclimatized into a lump, which is then recollected itself. Recoding is the interaction by which individual pieces are ‘recoded’ and allocated to lumps. Consequently the ends that can be drawn from Miller’s unique work is that, while there is an acknowledged breaking point to the quantity of pi