In contrast, the Lord Presidency of the Duke of Northumberland (1550-1553) dealt with the issues formed under Somerset, resulting in an era of relative peace that cannot be deemed a crisis; beginning with the Duke’s need to resolve foreign affairs. Unlike Somerset, Northumberland recognised that even remaining in a deadlock with Scotland and France was not sustainable for England and that the Duke needed to turn his attention to pressing domestic discontent. However, one can see why historians such as Pollard (1910) argue that the Treaty of Boulogne, which Northumberland negotiated with France in 1550, was “the most ignominious… signed by England during the century”. Certainly, on the surface, the treaty appears to have been drawn up in indecent haste, as if Northumberland was attempting to quickly resolve foreign matters to focus on domestic issues, but at the expense of placing England at a disadvantage. The Treaty of Boulogne appeared to favour the French to an unfair degree; stipulating the English evacuation of fortresses in Boulogne and Scotland yet there being no French evacuation of its forces in Scotland. Moreover, the treaty alienated Charles V, leading the Emperor to end special privileges enjoyed by England in the Netherlands, therefore implying that, like Somerset, Northumberland’s foreign policy would contribute to the English economic decline. However, one must set the treaty in the context it was signed. Contrary to Pollard, Smith (1984) argues that the Treaty of Boulogne “was certainly an inglorious settlement, but Northumberland should not be blamed for his realism in cutting England’s losses.” Indeed, one can note that Northumberland recognised that the English economy could not sustain funding its Scottish garrisons in their deadlock with Scotland and France, let alone match the forces of France in a potential war. The Duke also saw that domestic issues required his immediate attention, thus the treaty needed to be ratified quickly so that Northumberland could turn his focus to domestic affairs, without fears of foreign powers taking advantage of this to potentially invade. Thus, Smith’s view is convincing as even if England was placed at a disadvantage, the outcome of tentative peace was invariably better than plunging a domestically conflicted England into armed conflict with Scotland and France. Furthermore, Pollard’s view is also questionable when considering the economic impact of the Treaty of Boulogne, as the treaty may have actually saved the English economy from further damage. Regardless of Charles V decision to end Englan