terest of the elite ruling classes.
Moreover, economic crises can have a large role to play in mobilising a population against the elites and causing the fall of a non-democratic government. Although the elites do have “the monopoly over large scale violence, […] states in crisis can […] slide […] into even more instability”[7], particularly if a popular revolution is supported by a large proportion of the population, or, as in the case of Syria, the “improving […] economic conditions of the large Syrian refugee communities in neighbouring countries [provide] economic alternatives to joining armed groups”[8]; decreasing the state’s military stronghold over its population.
It is certain, however, that the likelihood of the collapse of a non-democratic regime as a result of an economic shock depends on its depth and severity, and the degree to which there is the resulting loss in welfare incentivising the population to mobilise. Furthermore, if the state is able to reallocate resources effectively despite an economic crisis, they may be able to withstand opposition to power; for example, by “[cutting] back outlays on subsidies, enabling it to concentrate more resources on the police, domestic security, and the state’s cultural and media propaganda machinery”[9] (page 165), as was undertaken in Egypt under Mubarak. While wealth and development are undoubtedly significant in causing a shift towards democratic governance, “authoritarian regimes around the world [have shown] that they can reap the benefits of economic development while evading any pressure to relax their political control. [An example is China’s economy, which] has grown explosively over the last 25 years, [even though] its politics have remained essentially stagnant.”[10] Evidence of this undermines the thesis that economic factors are the most significant.

A second possible explanation for some non-democratic regimes outliving others is the importance of cultural and religious factors.
As argued by Almond and Verba, there is a certain “‘civic culture’ [which] is necessary for the establishment of democracy, and […] this sort of culture is not easy transferable to non-Western cultures”[15]. The widespread acceptance of state authority and obedience towards civic duties defines the nature of Western culture: for example, the “obeying [of] the laws of the country, paying the taxes levied by the government [or] serving in a jury or as a witness in court”[16]. Almond and Verba argue the Western “mix of parochial passivity and modern participant activism”[17] is only compatible with certain cultures, and could be a factor fixing countries in non-democratic regimes. Some of the most likely explanations for this are likely to be historical religious influences, particularly the influence of Protestantism in the early 17th century in Western Europe. Steve Bruce argues that “Protestantism has contributed to modern democracy [by] pioneering a particularly effective combination of individualism and community spirit”[18], and the differing cultures of historically Islamic cultures are perhaps strengthening the likelihood of non-democratic regimes’ survivals today.
As explained in the view of Sayyid Qutb, “Islam is irreconcilable with the main assumpt