Now, Harriet’s wording here is important. If a reply to an offer introduces new, different terms not included in the original offer, this will be considered a counter-offer. This was proven in the case of Jones v Daniel, wherein in a letter accepting the offer Jones introduced new terms relating to the date of completion, amongst others. If Harriet had stated that she would accept the offer only if the deadline was extended to the 7th of November, for example, this would have been a counter-offer and not acceptance.

However, she asks if Gerald would perhaps consider extending the date. Inquiring whether the offeror will modify his terms does not necessarily amount to a counter-offer. The legal basis for this is shown in Stevenson, Jacques & Co v McLean: the plaintiffs could still accept the offer of the defendants because they had telegraphed requesting information as to certain possible terms of credit. Therefore it can be argued that Harriet’s text is sufficient acceptance.

Communication of Acceptance

If the wording of Harriet’s text is sufficient acceptance, we must now look to Harriet’s communication of it. There has to be clear communication to the offeror that their offer is accepted. Harriet chooses to text Gerald her acceptance of the offer. Gerald does not check his texts, does not receive her communication, and sells the car to someone else.

The rule for non-instantaneous methods of communication, such as post, is that acceptance is communicated as soon as the letter is posted (the ‘postal rule’, laid down in Adams v Lindsell). However in Entores v Miles Far East, Denning LJ held that for instantaneous methods of acceptance, acceptance occurs when and where the message of acceptance is received.