s the capacity for weak AI to analyse and act on its environment grows, an argument such as Searle’s (1999), that the AI is simply processing an algorithm without any formal understanding, appears susceptible to the criticism of what exactly ‘understanding’ entails (Pinker, 1997). A sufficiently developed weak AI may appear almost negligibly different to a strong AI, exhibiting traits to which humans may accord a certain notion of ‘understanding’, such as acting upon what it analyses a person to want, rather than what they are actually asking for (Saenz, 2010). In this light, it would seem arbitrary to deny it rights simply because it does not ‘think exactly like us’, while exhibiting traits of sentience. We attribute a limited understanding to young children and animals, so why not weak AI? Within the second part of my essay, highlighting the latter case, I will draw attention to the potential distinction between animal rights and the rights of weak AI.
Weak AI as an ‘animal level’ intelligence
Referring back to my initial description, weak AI lacks what humans would term ‘sentience’. Nonetheless, as I have briefly illustrated throughout the first part of my essay, there appear, contrary to our intuitions, to be some compelling reasons for considering weak AI as an object of at least some moral consideration. Singer’s (2014) case for animal rights can be invoked here in defence of weak AI. Although it is not actually ‘like us’, the fact that humans possess a higher or more refined degree of intelligence does not entail that humans can exploit AI with impunity. As we cannot give moral weight to our own species without committing ‘speciesism’, we appear to not be able to give more moral weight to being an organic life form over a synthetic one without committing to a form of discrimination. Thus we should consider weak AI as subject to some moral considerations, and the issue of whether or not it can be properly considered to consent to sexual acts returns. Within this section, I will first attempt to refute the notion of weak AI as a rights bearer, before turning to the implications if it is to be considered one.
Notably, within Singer’s (2014) utilitarian account, as with Bentham (1879), there is an emphasis on moral consideration being derived from the capacity to suffer, rather than reason and intelligence. In this instance, many variants of weak AI can be rejected as being rights bearers, as they do not possess the capacity to feel what we would term suffering. They do not possess interests, as they cannot suffer (Singer, 2014). Although this returns us to our initial position, and to the common sense conclusion that a smart kettle, as it cannot suffer, possesses no moral worth, it can be challenged in two ways.
Recent developments in technology are towards robots that ‘experience’ pain, and use it to adjust their behaviour. Such beings can be rightly said to ‘suffer’, and thus must be worthy of some moral consideration. Furthermore, these developments and this position create an uneasy distinction that must be reso
