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In their article “Why We Shouldn’t Embrace Backdoors in Encryption Software”, computer science researchers William Knottenbelt and Ian Molloy make the case against governments mandating backdoors into encryption software. They cite research which indicates that such a move would place data at risk of being exposed to malicious actors such as hackers or criminals (Knottenbelt & Molloy 2018). The authors argue that while law enforcement agencies may be able to access encrypted messages with codebreaking technology, requiring this same capability for all users would significantly weaken encryption standards. This could potentially lead to security flaws where sophisticated adversaries could exploit them, leading to widespread data breaches on a global scale (Knottenbelt & Molloy 2018). Furthermore, they point out that having only one master key for decrypting data removes any element of choice when it comes to user privacy; users have no control over who can access their information and have no way of knowing if it has been tampered with by someone else. I agree with the authors’ position that backdoors in encryption software should not be embraced, at least not without careful consideration given to all potential consequences. Improving public safety is important but must be done without compromising the security and autonomy of individual citizens. In my opinion, determining a balance between national security measures and personal freedom is critical in order for democracies to remain functioning and secure for future generations.