The culture and caring theory that resonates with me for my practice as a nurse practice is the Jean Watson theory of human caring. Watson`s philosophy and science of caring is concerned with how nurses express care to their patients. Her theory stresses the humanistic aspects of nursing as they intertwine with scientific knowledge and nursing practice. The nursing model states that “nursing is concerned with promoting health, preventing illness, caring for the sick, and restoring health.” it focuses on health promotion, as well as the treatment of disease. This theory encourages nurses to focus more on caring for their patients as opposed to curing the condition the latter have. It asserts that a human being cannot be healed as an object. It argues, on the contrary, that he/she is part of his/her self, environment, nature, and the larger universe.
n the usual case where competitor-bidding strategy is unknown, a range of bidding strategies, for both the bidder and the competitor(s), can be simulated and then economic game theory can be used to determine the optimal bidding strategy. While this type of analysis cannot guarantee an outcome or provide assurance that the winner’s curse will be avoided, the resulting bidding strategy can provide the bidding decision-maker with the best opportunity for success.
In this type of auction (one stage sealed bid) where there is high level of asymmetry and uncertainty, the optimal bidding strategy I would go with is the BID SHADING STRATEGY.
BID SHADING
In an auction, bid shading describes the practice of a bidder placing a bid that is below what they believe a good is worth.
Bid shading is used for one of two purposes. In a common value auction with high asymmetric information, bid shading is used to compensate for the winner’s curse. In such auctions, the good is worth the same amount to all bidders, but bidders don’t know the actual value of the commodity therefore they must independently estimate the price. Since all bidders value the good equally, the winner will generally be the bidder whose estimate of the value is largest. But if we assume that the bidders estimate the value accurately, then the highest bidder is most – likely to overestimate the good’s value and might end up paying more than it is worth. In other words, winning the auction carries bad news about a bidder’s value estimate. An understanding bidder will anticipate this, and reduce their bid accordingly.
Bid shading is also used in First-price Auctions, where the winning bidder pays the amount of his bid. If a participant bids an amount equal to their value for the good, they would gain nothing by winning the auction, since they are indifferent between the money and the good. Bidders will optimize their expected value by accepting lower odd
