argue that “disasters are unequivocally political because they invariably increase the number of demands on a political system as well as the novelty and complexity of those demands while at the same time wreaking havoc on system response capabilities.” They adduce that the shock created by natural disasters can precipitate political disturbances that aid the downfall or popularity of a government. If handled well, the disaster shock can also raise the political profile of the sitting government. (Bello 2008: 890)

To add on, Disaster Capitalism is reluctant to lump humanitarian assistance as one of the agents for the push of neoliberal policies in disaster response and recovery. Hans Morgenthau (1962) stipulated that the use of humanitarian aid as a tool for advancement of private interests is under-theorized in the literature. To that end, Hans Morgenthau (1962) provided one of the more lucid typologies of the foreign aid enterprise. For Morgenthau, humanitarian foreign assistance, along with subsistence, military, bribery, prestige, and foreign aid for economic development are all occasions for donors to exercise policy. Drury, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) support Morgenthau’s proposition and note that in the event of emergencies, relief agencies are fervent perpetrators of Disaster Capitalism. Disaster capitalism is enabled by bilateral humanitarian aid allocation. This is so because the strategic use of aid requests is an occasion for national and transnational commercial interests to advance policy preferences (Harmer and Cotterell 2009). The U.S has been a world leader in providing emergency and humanitarian relief during crises and disasters across the globe. However, Hurricane Katrina brought an unprecedented opportunity for INGOs to act outside of their organisational mandates, in addition to the U.S also receiving offers of help from developing nations (Richard 2006). A call for donations to Katrina efforts raised $3.3 billion in private donations; $2.1 billion went to the American Red Cross, $10 million to Mercy Corps and $11 million to World Vision (Kerkman 2006). The bigger INGOs introduced unfair competition for scarce recovery resources over smaller, local non-profits working in the affected areas. Many of the smaller NGOs closed shop as a result (Eikenberry, Arroyave and Cooper 2007: 166). Even though significant literature on Hurricane Katrina has ignored their participation and contribution, over twelve international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) provided humanitarian assistance for the first time ever in the United States in the aftermath of the catastrophe. They included organisations such as Oxfam, Save the Children, Amnesty International, American Refugee Committee, International Rescue Committee, UNICEF, International Relief and Development among others. They concentrated on meeting immediate and basic needs such as water and health treatment to displaced persons. Their response was largely as a reaction to the perceived failure by the state and federal administrators to coordinate international and local nongovernmental