Counterinsurgency Theory.
In their article “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” Conflict After the Cold War, pages 581-588, (Att.1), Eliot Cohen and his co-authors (several of whom were instrumental in the drafting of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency) (Att.2) posits eight “ Principles of Counterinsurgency.”
Which two of Cohen’s principles are most strongly reflected in the US COIN strategy in Afghanistan as outlined in President Obama’s December 2009 West Point speech (Att.3) and General Petraeus’s COMISAF COIN guidance (Att.4)?
Briefly describe the principles and explain how they are incorporated in US COIN strategy in 2009-2010 as outlined by the POTUS and GEN Petraeus.
Did the US Counterinsurgency strategy most closely resemble the “Cost/Benefit” or “Hearts and Minds” COIN theory identified in Austin Long’s article, “COIN Theory: What are Insurgencies and How Does One Fight Them?” (Att.5) Why?
Sample Solution
Two of Cohen’s principles that are most strongly reflected in the US COIN strategy in Afghanistan as outlined by President Obama and General Petraeus are: “Understand the environment” and “Secure and serve the population”.
President Obama’s December 2009 West Point speech emphasized that a successful COIN operation must be based upon an understanding of both Afghan history, culture, and custom. Additionally, he also highlighted the importance of protecting civilians from harm while simultaneously demonstrating commitment to improving their overall quality of life (Obama 2009). This is directly reflective of Cohen’s principle stating that understanding local context is key for any counterinsurgency campaign. Additionally, it also emphasizes that military operations must be coupled with efforts to build public trust by providing basic needs such as food, shelter, healthcare (Obama 2009). This too aligns with Cohen’s principle which states that a successful counterinsurgency effort requires forces to understand not only physical aspects but also human terrain; without addressing people’s needs there can be no sustainable victory against insurgents (Cohen et al., 2006).
Similarly General Petreaus’ COMISAF guidance on COIN operations also make reference to these two principles put forward by Cohen. In his document Petraeus highlights need for “comprehensive civil-military programs aimed at securing loyalty” among local populations as well its requirement for commanders to understand how social dynamics influence military operations carried out in Afghanistan as vital components for successfully defeating insurgency within area (Petraeus 2010) . It is clear then from both these documents presented by President Obama and General Petraeus respectively that they recognize understanding local community context along with providing necessary services needed by civilian population are essential elements required for defeating insurgency within country. These strategies closely reflect Cohen’s aforementioned imperatives which suggest same approach when dealing with insurgencies.
