Pain is not an unfamiliar experience to any one person. It’s important to not think of pain just as physical pain from a stubbed toe or broken bone, but also pain from the loss of a loved one or a failure. Often times, the sensation of pain is associated with misery and suffering throughout the existence of the supposed discomfort. However, Colin Klein details how that actually is not the case through his Imperative Theory of Pain. In it, he discusses how suffering is merely a consequence of pain and that the two are not synonymous. Using an Imperativist stance and a theory composed of relative simplicity, he presents a compelling argument. Throughout the entirety of this paper, I will detail Klein’s argument and discuss how he presents a theory of the relationship between pain and suffering that is correct.

Colin Klein looks at pain and suffering from an imperativist point of view. Imperativism concludes, according to Klein, that motivation is an intrinsic, or naturally belonging, feature of pain. Colin Klein begins his argument by discussing the two senses in which he believes pains motivate. He acknowledges pains do many things and the pains motivate the one who is experiencing said pain. Primary motivational force, Klein explains, is simply the command of the body to protect the affected and pained body part. He explains that the primary motivational force is simply derived from the content of the pain. Secondary motivation, however, is deeper than the idea of primary motivation. Secondary motivation contrasts primary motivation completely and includes all motivations that are extrinsic to pain. Klein explains how pain can often cause emotional and mental states directed toward or caused by the pain itself, but since secondary motivations are not always present, the emotions and motivational states can also be absent when pain is present. Klein describes situations in which pains arouse emotions and cause actions related to specific pains.

Furthermore, Klein describes pain and its relationship to suffering, which is of interest for this paper. Klein makes a point that because pains are unpleasant, it is generally acknowledged that people go out of their way to avoid them and get rid of them when they arise. Because hurt is a feature of pains both emotional and physical, it is often assumed that it must be an always occurring property of pain. Klein then offers four arguments to distinguish between pain and suffering. The first argument, he claims is also the simplest. He claims that pain and hurt come apart, and calls this the argument from dissociation. He explains that some pains don’t hurt, and many things that hurt aren’t pains. Klein gives example after example of pains that do not hurt, and hurts that do not stem from pain, but instead just motivate the bearer to move them self or take initiative to use their power to fix the pain.

The next argument he presents is the argument from independent variation. Before he delves into the argument, he reminds readers that the question trying to be answered is whether pain and suffering should be distinguished as separate phenomena, not whether pain can occur without suffering. He returns to the argument, stating that pain and suffering are able to independently vary from one another in their intensity. Simply stated, something can hurt intensely but not cause suffering or hurt mildly but bring intense suffering. He claims that this is solid evidence for his view that proposes pain intensity alone is part of pain, while suffering is a secondary characteristic. His third argument is what he calls the argument from differing domains. In it, he attempts to distinguish between pain and hurt. He states that all things that hurt don’t deserve the title of pain and continues to argue that pain and hurt motivate in different ways. His example describes it perfectly, where he says that pain from a heartbreak motivates acts that have set goals, where the pain from the heartbreak motivates actions that have goals to relieve the sensation of the heartbreak. He says this can be true of pain and suffering. Klein’s final argument considers phenomenology. He explains it clearly in his last paragraph of the argument:

“…separating pain and hurt takes an apparently heterogenous phenomenological set and
distinguishes two phenomenologically homogenous partitions. There’s pain, which is a
distinctive sensation with a distinctive motivational role, an