The colonization and seemingly nonsensical division of Africa by European powers in the late nineteenth century did nothing to prevent or stave ethnic conflict in the coming decades—although the politically motivated creation of new borders on the continent at least moderately contributed to later ethnic conflict. But did the festering wounds left by the European colonizers directly cause later ethnic violence? Rather than asking such a specific question, it is better to examine these conflicts as having both ultimate and more immediate causes. And this is how we must examine the case of Rwanda, and even its closely related sister, Burundi: indeed, their Belgian colonizers bred problems that ultimately led to the countries’ ethnic issues, culminating in a number of genocides in the latter half of the twentieth century; but it was their own people and political strife that was at the root of the problem (BBC). Moreover the ultimate and more immediate causes often co mingle, as one may give rise to the other. Because of the shifts in political power brought on by the Belgians in their countries the various ethnic groups there became increasingly more violent. Soon violent incidents became the norm, directly ushering in the ethnic conflicts between the Hutu and Tutsi years later.

Theoretical Answer

In order to better understand the leap from ethnic conflict to genocide, it is important to take into account how different approaches would address this issue. As such, in this section, I’ll be addressing the link between ethnic conflict and genocide through the lens of rationalism, culturalism, and structuralism.

A rationalist approach would assume that ethnic conflict, like all human interaction, is the result of individual’s rational pursuit of universal interests such as wealth, power, and security. Conflict among ethnic lines creates uncertainty of each groups intentions, and may overestimate hostilitle actions, thus escalating the conflict further. They are also uncertain about outcomes in case of conflict, and thus don’t know when to concede and avoid catastrophe. The main insight is that strategies of mass violence are developed in response to real and perceived threats to the maintenance of political power.