This complaint about epistemic contextualism (EC) raises a valid concern, but it’s not necessarily a fair dismissal of the theory. Here’s a breakdown:

The Complaint:

The critique argues that EC doesn’t provide a satisfying explanation for how we can truly “know” things according to everyday standards. Since EC suggests knowledge standards shift depending on context, particularly in skeptical scenarios, it seems to undermine the very notion of having secure knowledge.

Why EC Might Not Be Entirely to Blame:

• EC Doesn’t Deny Everyday Knowledge: EC doesn’t claim that we can’t have knowledge in everyday situations. It acknowledges that under ordinary circumstances, we often meet the standards for knowledge claims. For example, knowing your friend is at home because you just saw them walk in.
• Skepticism Raises the Bar, Not Eliminates Knowledge: EC argues that skeptical contexts raise the bar for what constitutes knowledge. However, it doesn’t necessarily negate the possibility of attaining knowledge under those stricter standards. It just requires stronger justification.

However, EC Does Have Challenges:

• Circular Reasoning? Some argue that EC might be circular. It defines knowledge based on what counts as justification in a specific context, but then relies on the notion of “knowing” to determine the context itself.
• The Skeptical Challenge Remains: Even with heightened standards, EC might struggle to provide a definitive answer to strong skeptical arguments like the brain-in-a-vat scenario.

So, is it a fair complaint?

It’s a fair point to raise. EC doesn’t offer a universally accepted solution to the problem of skepticism. However, it does offer an alternative perspective on knowledge that acknowledges the context-sensitivity of knowledge claims.

Here’s an analogy: Imagine judging the athletic ability of someone running a marathon versus someone running a short sprint. You wouldn’t use the same criteria. Similarly, EC suggests that the standards for “knowing” might differ based on the context, with skepticism raising the bar for justification.

Further Points:

• Some versions of EC propose specific criteria for knowledge claims under different contexts.
• There are ongoing debates about the strength of EC’s arguments and its ability to fully address skepticism.

Overall, the complaint highlights a key challenge for EC, but doesn’t necessarily render it useless. EC provides a valuable framework for understanding the complexities of knowledge and the influence of context on knowledge claims.