Irony inverts our expectations. It can create the unexpected twist at the end of a joke or a story that gets us laughing, or crying. Verbal irony occurs when a speaker`s intention is the opposite of what he or she is saying. For example, a character stepping out into a hurricane and saying, “What nice weather we are having!” Situational irony occurs when the actual result of a situation is totally different from what you would expect the result to be. Sitcoms often use situational irony. For example, a family spends a lot of time and money planning an elaborate surprise birthday party for their mother to show her how much they care. But it turns out, her birthday is next month, and none of them knew the correct date. She ends up fuming that no one cares enough to remember her birthday.
l, the success of the ontological argument isn’t dependent on a possession of a complete and utter understanding of the concept of Being than which None Greater Can Be Conceived. For example, while we don’t possess a complete understanding (which itself is an ambiguous term) of the concept of a natural number that which nothing greater can be comceived, we understand it well enough to understand that this number cannot exist. Thus a more complete understanding of the concept of a maximally great being is not required, based on Anselm’s view, to make the argument in question. After all, if the concept itself is coherent, than even a minimal understanding of it is enough to make the argument. Thus, while Aquinas has, in a similar manner to Gaunilo, highlighted the importance of correctly understanding the concepts involved, it doesn’t fundamentally detract from the argument itself.
At the same time, the idea of a being that exists in reality is greater than a being that exists merely in the mind, thus a great-making quality, is also a key premise. After all, it entails two things: firstly, that existence is a property and secondly, that existence makes something better, other things being equal, than it would have done otherwise. Based on these two principles, Kant rejects premise 3 on the ground that, as a purely formal matter, existence does not function as a predicate. As Kant puts the point: “Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of something which is added to the conception of some other thing, but is “merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it”. In a logical sense, it is “merely the copula” of a given judgement. To say as a proposition “God is omnipotent” involves conveying two separate ideas, which have a certain object or content” and thus the word “is” is merely indicative of the relation between the two conceptions.
Now, if one were take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one), and say, God is, or There is a God, new predicate is added to the conception of God. Instead, the existence of the subject is merely posited with all its predicates in relation to a particular conception. Accordingly, what goes wrong with the first version of the ontological argument is that the notion of existence is being treated as the wrong logical type. Concepts, as a logical matter, are defined entirely in terms of logical predicates. Since existence isn’t a logical predicate, it doesn’t belong to the concept of God; it rather affirms that the existence of something that satisfies the predicates defining the concept of God.
Although this choice of criticism is phrased in a somewhat obscure manner in the lo
