and impacts leading to non-compliance, the theory is very heavily individualistic and does not accurately explain collective discretion and its implications on the wider scope of policy legitimacy, democratic legitimacy, and policy change. Partly due to the rigid institutional design already in place that limits administrative capabilities, agents would tend to partake in ‘creative compliance’ to enable them to better and more strategically allocate and prioritize resources for the tasks the principal does not give enough attention to. Broadening the individualistic approach the PAT adopts, Rutz, Epstein & O’Halloran, Tummers & Bekkers, Hupe & Buffat, and Gofen discuss the implications of collective discretion on the overarching organization, and policy implications it may bring regarding policy legitimacy and policy change through democratic legitimacy in allowing for collective discretion. Where the PAT merely views divergence as an individual agent’s coping mechanism in facing the increasing pressures the job entails , the following section aims to increase macro-level contextual analyses on collective discretion.

With the increasing need for discretionary allowance and the importance of discretion in the principal-agent relationship, the PAT’s understanding of the policy implementation process does not discuss the broader debate about collective discretionary rooms and ‘discretionary floors’ within a typical agency. The PAT does not account for the degrees of discretion (and non-compliance) that vary across circumstance and sectors, where higher policy stakes often equates to a greater possibility and potential of ‘creative compliance’ – in the form of ‘discretion-as-perceived’ by the respected agents. Epstein & O’Halloran (1994) discuss the need for increased agent discretion, given information asymmetry and distant principal-agent relationship. Rutz