1.) Select a follow-on mission for the space shuttle
State the requirements of the follow-on mission. You can state the requirements of the mission in relation to the ISS mission. Hence, state the new mission parameters based on the ISS mission. Don’t worry about making this perfect. Provide a set of mission parameters that you think are reasonable for a follow-on mission.
2.) Select a shuttle technology for upgrade
Select a shuttle technology that you think requires a significant upgrade. State reasons as to why you need to upgrade the technology for the follow-on mission. The reasons could be better payload, higher safety, higher range, etc. You can even consider upgrading multiple shuttle technologies.
If you feel that extending the shuttle program for your follow-on mission is not an optimal path, then select any space transportation system that you think can accomplish your mission. This could be any system from the past or present. Compare your system to the shuttle and state why it is optimal to select your transportation system.
emotional level. . .rather than one of rational, calculated gain” (Dingley and Mollica 2007, 466). Before the strikes, the IRA had been seen as a calculated, cold terrorist organization. Even though the process of choosing those to participate in the strike was rational and thought-out, the results of the strikes were the opposite, changing the public view with influential symbols people could get behind.
Furthermore, the aftermath of the 1980s strikes allowed for Sinn Fein to become more political in 1982, a shift that would not be possible without a positive public image. A nonviolent strategy increased their political clout; in 1983, Sinn Fein won about 43% of the nationalist vote but dropped to 35% in 1987 due to IRA violence (Pruitt 2007, 1521). The hunger strikers, especially Bobby Sands, displayed a nonviolent, human version of the IRA that went over well with the international community and the nationalist population. This “peaceful” strategy also helped with electoral participation (Neumann 2005, 942). In order to keep the moderates voting for them, Sinn Fein and the IRA had to limit the violence that turned some nationalists away from them in the first place. While the installment of Sinn Fein as a political party was viewed as a decrease in IRA violence, that was not entirely the case. Giving a nonviolent party with ties to a paramilitary political access only legitimized what the IRA was doing by demonstrating a large amount electoral support. It was no secret that Sinn Fein and the IRA were linked, and in the 1980s, a significant amount of the nationalist population voted for them despite the small numbers of extremists that supported the IRA. With seats in Parliament, Sinn Fein could limit the amount of harsh policies targeting the paramilitary branch (Neumann 2005, 952). Based on the electoral statistics of Sinn Fein in the 1980s, the party did better politically when the IRA was viewed as nonviolent. In both elections (1982 and 1987), the violence and IRA attacks did not diminish based on how well Sinn Fein did in the polls. Sinn Fein’s popularity depended greatly on public image, and less of what was happening internally; this was boosted to a more positive light when Bobby Sands was elected, as he was already a popular figure worldwide.
Throughout the Troubles, support of the IRA increased when large-scale grievances were placed upon on the nationalists, such as the death toll on Bloody Sunday. The 1960s established a narrative of collective victimhood for the Catholic minority and many nationalists, which stood as a platform for the hunger strikers to build-up on and create a more positive image of the IRA and the “freedom fighters” that were apart of the organization. Because of this, Sinn Fein became a popular political party bolstered by a public image of non-violence despite what was happening and not reported on behind the scenes. When the IRA did not come across as a terrorist organization, they were