at the expense of placing England at a disadvantage. The Treaty of Boulogne appeared to favour the French to an unfair degree; stipulating the English evacuation of fortresses in Boulogne and Scotland yet there being no French evacuation of its forces in Scotland. Moreover, the treaty alienated Charles V, leading the Emperor to end special privileges enjoyed by England in the Netherlands, therefore implying that, like Somerset, Northumberland’s foreign policy would contribute to the English economic decline. However, one must set the treaty in the context it was signed. Contrary to Pollard, Smith (1984) argues that the Treaty of Boulogne “was certainly an inglorious settlement, but Northumberland should not be blamed for his realism in cutting England’s losses.” Indeed, one can note that Northumberland recognised that the English economy could not sustain funding its Scottish garrisons in their deadlock with Scotland and France, let alone match the forces of France in a potential war. The Duke also saw that domestic issues required his immediate attention, thus the treaty needed to be ratified quickly so that Northumberland could turn his focus to domestic affairs, without fears of foreign powers taking advantage of this to potentially invade. Thus, Smith’s view is convincing as even if England was placed at a disadvantage, the outcome of tentative peace was invariably better than plunging a domestically conflicted England into armed conflict with Scotland and France. Furthermore, Pollard’s view is also questionable when considering the economic impact of the Treaty of Boulogne, as the treaty may have actually saved the English economy from further damage. Regardless of Charles V decision to end England’s special privileges, the state of the Netherlands at the time meant that English privileges looked to fade anyway. The southern Netherlands, especially Antwerp, were already in economic decline and the northern parts of the Netherlands were in the state of Protestant Reformation, that would soon lead to full-scale conflict with the Hapsburgs. Therefore, separate to the ratification of the treaty, English commercial interests would not have lasted in the Netherlands. Rather, one may even make the argument that it was better that Northumberland had signed the treaty as it unknowingly preempted the decline of English privileges in the Netherlands. Northumberland’s administration sought alternative outlets of trade such as across the Barbary coast in 1551 and west Africa from 1553. Therefore, considering the evidence, Smith‘s view is