nd Ivorian conflicts, both death toll and population displacement would appear to constitute ‘mass atrocity’. It would appear, therefore, that the UN and the international community has failed to protect the citizens of Darfur in an appropriate manner. It would be unfair to say that the UN has not taken action as the UN and African Union has established a 26,000 personnel strong mission for the alleviation of the conflict in Sudan. (ICRtoP, n.d) Between 2007 and 2012 their mandate was extended 4 times however each mandate affirms the UN’s “determination to work with the Government of Sudan, in full respect of its sovereignty.” (Ibid) This would seem to clarify why there has been no direct military action to resolve the conflict, however, this highlights a major criticism levelled at R2P Protect regarding 21st-century African conflict, why is it deemed acceptable to breach national sovereignty in some cases but not others which could be deemed as a greater humanitarian threat? In a generalised sense the literature can be summarised as treating “Darfur and R2P as coterminous with failure” with “inaction underscoring its limitations to protect civilian populations.” (Verhoeven and Jaganathan 2015, pp21-37) I believe, however, it is difficult to analyse R2P as one concept across 21st-century African conflict as a whole. I would argue that the manner in which R2P is applied has to be considered through the spectrum of the conflict itself. Both Libya and Cote D’Ivoire represented conflicts which were both time sensitive and feasibly resolvable with military action, in the eyes of the international community. Conversely, Sudan, represented a hugely complex situation with a series of militia groups undertaking attacks over a longer period of time, making mediation, possibly, the most likely resolution due to the embedded nature of conflict. This is to say that in the case of Darfur it could be argued that the UN applied the concept of R2P in the manner they saw to be most fit as it is argued that simple military intervention would have been “dangerous reductionism” of the situations complexity. (Hassan and Ray 2009, p295)

The R2P doctrine in itself is incredibility difficult to assess as a whole, due to inherent differences between conflicts, its application is virtually impossible to standardize. As a concept, however, it both presents an attempt to formulate a coherent plan regarding humanitarian intervention, and an attempt to learn from the costly mistakes of the past. This is a sentiment echoed by UN General Secretary Ban-Ki Moon who defines R2P as “a concept whose time has come. For many millions of victims, it should have come much earlier.” (Moon 2012) With regard to 21st-century African conflict, I would argue that the impact has been broadly positive. Of course, the criticisms of R2P which can be applied to African conflict, such as the seeming inconsistency of its application, or the problematic issues regarding