ial decision making is that it only gives judges weak discretion. Principles provide a check on judges by giving them law to work with in hard cases where clear rules are absent. Through this weaker discretion, we can be assured that judges aren’t free to decide cases however they like. Dworkin explains that judges are bound to the relevant principles when ruling in a hard case. He compares this to a person adding a chapter in a chain novel. As an author writing the next chapter, you are constrained by what happened before in the previous chapter. Likewise, a judge can’t simply base their decision on whatever they please because they have to act in good faith to the relevant principles. Thus, the principle model gives the judge much weaker discretion than the legislative model.

In addition to judicial discretion, the litigant’s role within the principle model is another reason I think it is superior to the legislative model. It seems inherent to me that a litigant should have the ability to claim that hey have a right to win their case, even in hard cases. Unlike the legislative model, which holds a litigant doesn’t have any rights in hard cases because the law runs out, the principle model establishes that principles can apply when rules run out and thus enables a litigant to claim they have a right to win. Furthermore even after losing a case, claiming that you had a right to win makes sense and can only make sense in the principle model. Dworkin points out that one can argue to have weighed the relevant principles in a more persuasive way than the court. Appeals lawyers, dissenting judges, and appeals judges who overrule lower courts make these cases all the time (Murphy and Coleman, 45-46). These persons are appealing and dissenting on the law. Consequently, even in hard cases, there is still law in the form of principles.

Proponents of Hart’s legislative model would probably respond to my view that Riggs v. Palmer was decided using principles, by claiming the judges decided to legislate new law, not appeal to principles. Hart’s followers would argue there weren’t rules applicable to the case, so the judges legislated a new rule that you can’t benefit from your own fraud. They would reject the notion that the judges used moral principles to decide the case. Another counter argument to my claims would be if judges really do have strong discretion under the principle model. Opponents could argue that there are probably many different relevant principles a judge could apply to a hard case which allows the judge considerable room to choose whatever principle suits their personal views best. They could also claim the “chain novel” example meant to illustrate the constraints on judge’s discretion fails to do so. Arguing that in the example there are still many different outcomes that would fit the previous chapters. They could reference “you choose” novels where the reader can pick which path they follow in the story from a variety of options. This would seem to contradict the idea that applying principles prevents judges from simply basing decisions on their own views. Lastly, my opponents would argue against my belief that a litigant can plausibly claim to have had a right to win a case in which they lost. They would argue that rights, according to Hart, are aspects of legal rules and in hard cases there are no clear rules. Thus, in a hard case a litigant cannot have a “right” to win since their aren’t legal rules to establish a right.

In response to my opponent’s claims that Riggs v. Palmer is simply and example of judicial legislation, I would argue that since there was a clear rule that existed in this case, there would have been no need to legislate. Only appealing to an overriding principle could have created the decision to refuse giving the inheritance to the murderer. This case plainly shows that judges appeal to moral principles in hard cases. Secondly, the view that judges have strong discretion in the principle model is false. Although judges do have room when deciding what principles are relevant, they are still bound to pre-existing law. Furthermore, the chain novel example holds firm, because while a judge may have many different principles they can apply to a case, only one or two will be a great fit. Ultimately, in the legislative model, judges are constructing new law, which is clearly stronger form of discretion than under the principle model where judges merely apply existing law. Finally, dissenting opinions in the U.S. Supreme Court and appeals judges overruling lower courts decisions enforces my belief that even in hard cases, litigants have claim to a right. Principles provide the basis for litigant’s to claim a right to win by filling the legal gap when rules run out.

Overall, I believe it is clear that Dworkin’s principle model provides the best insight into how judges decide hard cases. The litigant’s role and the strength of discretion given to judges under the principle model are more accurate and effective. The notion within the principle model that when the rules run out, principles fill the gap is demonstrated quite clearly in hard cases’ decisions. To make judges legislators, as Hart does, simply gives them too much power and discretion. Finally, it is only