complicated, this is generally divided by suggestions of an increase in choice and educational quality, contested with an exacerbation of social inequalities, misuse of data and questions around the sustainability of such a market (Exley, 2014; Ball, 2017; Croxford and Raffe, 2007; Power and Frandji, 2010). To critically evaluate these contrasting perspectives within the confines of this essay, discussion shall chiefly address the introduction of choice, the effects of performativity and ultimately, the evolving landscape of education.
Power and Choice:
Fundamental to operation of a market system (Ball, 2017), choice mechanisms, in theory, allow the consumer to express their desires, forcing producers to respond appropriately or risk failure (Harris and Sass, 2011). With regards to education, such choice is established through various channels of communication, most notably the publication of league tables (Hirsch, 2002), thus affording parents the opportunity to compare and then choose. It is the ensuing competition between schools that becomes an underpinning feature of the educational quasi-market (Dumay and Dupriez, 2014; Goldring and Phillips, 2008), despite contention around the accuracy of published data and the advocacy of condensing an educational institution to measurable data and a league position (Hirsch, 2002; Ball, 2017). Supporters of such choice highlight how the empowerment of parents develops an educational system that is reflective of the needs of each child (Coldron, 2007; Exley, 2014; Trowler, 2003), however running parallel with this are issues around ‘cream-skimming’ (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993, p.150) and the reality that sociological factors prevent all parents from exercising their choice equally (Ball, 2017; Gorard, Taylor and Fitz, 2003).
‘Cream-skimming’ in education broadly involves oversubscribed institutions favouring those individuals, generally the children of middle-class parents (Ball, 2008; Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993), that are likely to bring the greatest return for the least investment (Barlett and Le Grand, 1993). This is grounded by the logic that individuals whom may be identified as gifted or as having special educational needs will cost more to educate, ultimately reducing their perceived profitability. Whilst personal experience can neither confirm or deny that such practice takes place, a study undertaken by Baviskar (2018) reports that this is a widespread issue that is inherent to educational market systems, ultimately highlighting how the dynamics of a free market and the quasi-market of education are vastly different (Dumay and Dupriez, 2014). Whilst a free market would encourage producers to consistently improve and subsequently occupy a greater market share, this cannot exist in education as schools are limited by their physical size. Consequently, it is actually
