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bombings. It praised the courage and determination of emergency service staff on the day, but said that some of the processes used by the organisations involved needed to be addressed. Overall, the response to the bombings demonstrated the strength and flexibility of the UK’s emergency response arrangements; The need to better share information and provide practical and emotional support to bereaved and survivors, the importance of establishing Reception and Assistance Centres quickly, and the telecommunications equipment used by the emergency services worked well although older systems did not perform as efficiently. But, however inspiring the individual acts of heroism preformed by police officers, fire fighters and paramedics, the uncomfortable truth is that the emergency services’ response to 7 July was hampered by delays, communication failures, tactical confusion and a jobsworth adherence to protocol that at times defied common sense. Again and again, survivors spoke of the appalling wait for rescuers, even as they felt themselves slipping ever closer to death. Fire crews did not arrive at Edgware Road until an hour after the attacks. The first paramedic on the scene called urgently for ambulances; he learned later that ambulances from two stations nearby had not been dispatched. Paramedics intended for Russell Square were sent to the wrong location, meaning they also arrived almost an hour after the attack. Fire fighters arrived at King’s Cross-station at 9.13am but did not go to the scene of the blast until 9.42am because of communication protocols. Police and fire fighters were forced to use runners between tunnels and station concourses because their radio system at the time did not work underground.

Most worrying, perhaps, was what emerged at the inquest about the “Gold” command centre at London Ambulance Service headquarters. This was a scene of barely contained chaos, in which staff could not log on to computers, messages were scribbled on pieces of paper and subsequently lost, and a single operator was handling every 999 call and radio message relating to the four bomb sites. Three hour