y used the hunger strikers collective victimhood to their advantage as a massive propaganda campaign for the cause. The death of ten prisoners sparked an jump in paramilitary recruitment and nationalist riots, enforcing the “victim of injustice” (Lynch and Joyce 2018, 188) narrative that was not as effective before the 1980s, and served to radicalize the community in a nonviolent way. The leader of the Catholic Church in Ireland, Cardinal Tomás Ó Fiaich, compared the conditions of the prisoners to those living in the slums of Calcutta and stated that “no one could look on them as criminals” (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 140). While no longer a solely religious struggle, the plight of the hunger strikers was being felt by Catholics across the globe, with reports from the Vatican talking about the “sacrifices” these brave men have made. Despite Unionist claims and general outrage, the cardinal’s visit was a win for the IRA. The images of the filth and poor lifestyles of the “freedom fighters” were displayed worldwide. Instead of hurting others with bombings and random attacks, the hunger strikes did not physically hurt anyone except for those who chose to starve. The change in tactics improved their image; just like on Bloody Sunday, nationalists were dying in protest of what they thought unfair, becoming true victims of injustice.
Specific strikers also were known worldwide. Bobby Sands became a public figure who eventually became a martyr for the cause. Since he had been jailed for weapon possession instead of murder, he had a friendly media image, looking “more like a drummer in a rock band than a ruthless terrorist” (McKittrick and McVea 2004, 143). Bobby Sands’s image being plastered on news stations across the world was effective propaganda, changing the IRA’s image to a more sympathetic, humanizing one. His election as an MP before his death furthered this, making a politician out of a supposed “terrorist.” Members weren’t just men with guns and balaclavas; instead, they were “rockstars” unfairly interned and killed just for possessing weapons. With this line of thought in mind, it’s easy to understand why the IRA had to resort to violence in the first place. They were just freedom fighters pushed to take drastic measures to regain the rights taken from them in earlier discriminatory laws and practices. Sands’s death strengthened the nationalist community, as martyrs “provide a rallying symbol that operates on an emotional level. . .rather than one of rational, calculated gain” (Dingley and Mollica 2007, 466). Before the strikes, the IRA had been seen as a calculated, cold terrorist organization. Even though the process of choosing those to participate in the strike was rational and thought-out, the results of the strikes were the opposite, changing the public view with influential symbols people could get behind.
Furthermore, the aftermath of the 1980s strikes allowed for Sinn Fein to become more political in 1982, a shift that would not be possible without a positive public image. A nonviolent strategy increased their political clout; in 1983, Sinn Fein won about 43% of the nationalist vote but dropped to 35% in 1987 due to IRA violence (Pruitt 2007, 1521). The hunger strikers, especially Bobby Sands, displayed a nonviolent, human version of the IRA that went over well with the international community and the nationalist population. This “peaceful” strategy also helped with electoral participation (Neumann 2005, 942). In order to keep the moderates voting for them, Sinn Fein and the IRA had to limit the violence that turned some nationalists away from them in the first place. While the installment of Sinn Fein as a political party was viewed as a decrease in IRA violence, that was not entirely the case. Giving a nonviolent party with ties to a paramilitary political access only legitimized what the IRA was doing by demonstrating a large amount electoral support. It was no secret that Sinn Fein and the IRA were linked, and in the 1980s, a significant amount of the nationalist population voted for them despite the small numbers of extremists that supported the IRA. With seats in Parliament, Sinn Fein could limit the amount of harsh policies targeting the paramilitary branch (Neumann 2005, 952). Based on the electoral statistics of Sinn Fein in the 1980s, the party did better politically when the IRA was viewed as nonviolent. In both elections (1982 and 1987), the violence and IRA attacks did not diminish based on how well Sinn Fein did in the polls. Sinn Fein’s popularity depended greatly on public image, and less of what was happening internally; this was boosted to a more positive light when Bobby Sands was elected, as he was already a popular figure worldwide.
Throughout the Troubles, support of the IRA increased when large-scale grievances were placed upon on the nationalists, such as the death toll on Bloody Sunday. The 1960s established a narrative of collective victimhood for the Catholic minority and many nationalists, which stood as a platform for the h
