In continental Europe, it is the responsibility of many CCs to determine the separation of powers between the three branches of government in a mediatory capacity. Currently, the FCC in Germany operates a system of ‘Organstreit’ that transforms ex-ante review into an additional tool of checks and balances in order to invalidate ultra vires proceedings – this process attempts to resolve the disputes about the rights and duties of higher federal organs; possible parties include government and officials, as well as the President, political parties and MPs .
A striking example of the extent of the FCC’s jurisdiction in this regard was the response to the conflict over the 1982 parliamentary vote of no confidence. The FCC used a very permissive approach to reinforce the parliamentary minority’s unconstitutionality claim; by second-guessing the political attitudes of the executive, it was able to add a new, substantial and unwritten criterion to the highly political procedure in which three constitutional organs must consent to the dissolution of parliament for it to be deemed constitutionally valid. More recent seizures of the court have encompassed conflicts of scope between National and European bodies.

The UKSC reforms don’t need to go so far as to second-guess parliamentary intention, however, there persists a strong argument that the UKSC should adopt an ex-ante system, in which ‘privileged individuals’, such as the parliamentary opposition and the House of Lords, can seize the court to petition executive action. For instance, instead of the concrete review procedure in the 2017 Miller case that was brought on the grounds of rights infringement, the UKSC should have been consulted by Parliament directly over the need for parliamentary approval of Article 50.

3) A recommendation of transferral of EU constitutional court powers to UKSC

Strike-Down Powers:

European CCs almost always have the competence to invalid statutory law if they feel if goes against the grain of the constitution, and therefore to shield civil rights from the exercise of parliamentary tyranny. Many courts can even go so far as to reform major constitutional predicaments without parliamentary approval – in January 2017, the ‘Italicum’ ruling of the Corte Constituzionale went so far as to effectively change the electoral system from a majoritarian system to a proportional one.

In the UK, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty does not support parliamentary abuse of power, yet doesn’t grant any organ enough power to halt encroachment of civil rights – both s.4 HRA and the JR procedure only provide the appellate courts with very limited retributionary powers. If domestic legislation is fo