thoritarian regime; holding beliefs which perhaps do not align as well with democratic governments. It could be argued, for example, that Sharia Law can foster the unequal treatment of women, while it has made space for “a violent Islamic radical movement: Boko Haram, [which] proffers religious authoritarianism as an alternative to democracy”[13].
The extent to which this is true is, of course, debatable, particularly since “Sharia movements draw popular support, especially from lower and middle class Muslims, [since the movements support] social, economic and political reforms meant to provide economic and physical security and accountability”[13]. M. Steven Fish builds on this point, arguing that the “unusual degree of subordination of women in Muslim societies”[19] is not actually caused by an oppressive nature of the religion itself; rather, the position of women has been determined by the historically “kin-based political power [in the] North African countries”[19] . Moreover, according to Freedom House, Indonesia, “the most populous Muslim country in the world, receives very high scores for both civil rights and political rights”[14]; a certain demonstration of the compatibility of Islam with democracy in a contemporary real-world scenario. It may therefore not be as great a contributing factor in the survival of non-democratic regimes as one might have expected.
A third possible explanation for the lengthy survival of a non-democratic regime could be a small winning coalition.

Defined as “the sub-set of the selectorate whose support is necessary for the leader to remain in power”[20], the winning coalition, as shown above in Figure 3, is very important in determining whether a non-democratic regime can survive; the larger it becomes as a proportion of the selectorate, the greater the likelihood of the next most popular regime being able to take power. The size itself is mainly influenced by the type of authoritarian regime, and is particularly small in the case of monarchies, which, in the case of hereditary monarchies, only require the approval of a branch of the ruling family in order to survive. As explained by Bueno de Mesquita et al., “in autocratic systems, the winning coalition is often a small group of powerful individuals. [Thus] when a challenger emerges to the sitting leader and proposes an alternative allocation of resources, [the leader thwarts the challenge since he or she] retains