sex, or national origin.” The temporary annulment of these two laws – described as necessary to speed up the recovery process – allowed for contractors to reap enormous profits within this vacuum of deregulation. The ability to focus strictly on profit maximization led to numerous cases of prejudicial contracting, discriminatory employment practices, and the abuse of health and safety standards. It was not until affected groups were able to mobilize, coupled with the public censuring by civil rights alliances, that these regulations were reinstated (Bennett 2006; Olam and Stamper 2006; Button and Oliver-Smith 2008; Schuller 2008).

Whereas disaster capitalism theory provides an authentic outlook of the manipulation of Hurricane Katrina by self-interested individuals, government officials and big corporations to make money, it is not without criticism and theoretical limitations.

There is a dearth of literature on Hurricane Katrina about the significance and impact of politics in disaster response and recovery efforts. Disaster Capitalism cannot be theorized without capturing the essence of the prevalent politics inherent pre and post disaster. Disaster politics and disaster capitalism go hand-in-hand (Pelling and Dill 2010: 22). The exclusion of disaster politics discussions is a major limitation of the theoretical framing of disaster capitalism. Olson and Gawronski (2010: 267) argue that “disasters are unequivocally political because they invariably increase the number of demands on a political system as well as the novelty and complexity of those demands while at the same time wreaking havoc on system response capabilities.” They adduce that the shock created by natural disasters can precipitate political disturbances that aid the downfall or popularity of a government. If handled well, the disaster shock can also raise the political profile of the sitting government. (Bello 2008: 890)

To add on, Disaster Capitalism is reluctant to lump humanitarian assistance as one of the agents for the push of neoliberal policies in disaster response and recovery. Hans Morgenthau (1962) stipulated that the use of humanitarian aid as a tool for advancement of private interests is under-theorized in the literature. To that end, Hans Morgenthau (1962) provided one of the more lucid typologies of the foreign aid enterprise. For Morgenthau, humanitarian foreign assistance, along with subsistence, military, bribery, prestige, and foreign aid for economic development are all occasions for donors to exercise policy. Drury, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) support Morgenthau’s proposition and note that in the event of emergencies, relief agencies are fervent perpetrators of Disaster Capitalism. Disaster capitalism is enabled by bilateral humanitarian aid allocation. This is so because the strategic use of aid requests is an