everything else being equal.’ They also makes the claim those only military forces that are ‘truly joint, with comprehensively integrated capabilities can fully exploit the highly path-dependent nature of Information Age warfare.’ This certainly enforces the view that modern military operations require a network-centric approach to be effective. It is thus indubitable that possessing an integrated network capability does indeed prove to be a ‘game changer’ when facing an enemy who does not possess such capability.

3. It has been amply demonstrated that an Integrated Communication Network has been established as a core element of modern military operations. Given the ever-evolving and increasing role that technology possesses in warfare, it becomes more crucial to make certain that forces have the information, intelligence and situational awareness they require to achieve their objectives. Not only is technology changing conflict, but the manner in which militaries wage war is also changing. An increasingly prevalent theory of war is that of joint operations, defined by the US Department of Defence as ‘military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces in specified command relationships with each other’. As armies, air forces and navies work together to achieve political goals, warfare becomes more complex and operations become larger. Carl von Clausewitz talks of the uncertainty of information that is experienced in the fog of war. Although this paper does not suggest that integrated communications can lift this fog totally, the evidence suggests that it will bring a degree of clarity and awareness to the battlefield. Using communications technology to provide even dispersed forces with the latest information guarantees that forces are better informed and therefore more likely to make the right decisions. Successful joint operations depend on a number of very different but capable forces working together. A centralised communication infrastructure along with a supportive joint communication/ operation doctrine can oversee such joint operations and act as a hub for communication with and direction of any of the units in the theatre, be it a modern fighter aircraft or a team of Special Forces.

4. Thus far, both the theoretical concepts surrounding integrated communications and the practical uses of the doctrine have been described. Ample evidence from recent military operations has clearly demonstrated that in the increasingly technological theatre of war a network centric approach to modern military operations in indispensable for achieving information dominance and an upper hand over any potential adversary. Integrated communications although is an integral component of modern conflict, it still has various deficiencies. It is important to address these issues so as to give a fuller insight into the Integrated Communication Network enabled operations. One of the major issues identified is a heavy reliance on technology, particularly infrastructure. There are various reasons why reliance on infrastructure brings with it significant risk. It can become the primary centre of gravity for opponents to exploit. This is particularly hazardous if alternative ways of working are not available. If this network becomes so critical to warfare that forces become incapable of fighting in a non-network centric fashion, there is little doubt that any disruption to networks that they are dependent on could be catastrophic and potentially crippling for a military. Nor is there any doubt that a capable enemy would attempt to exploit this weakness by disrupting networks.

5. An Integrated Communication Network provides a level of situational awareness that allows the military to be more flexible, which without doubt increases mission effectiveness. However, it is clear that it is not, by any means without flaws. A heavy reliance on technology is problematic, as it cannot be ruled out that technology may fail, may not be available at the time, and may be targeted by an enemy to reduce war-fighting capability. As the Integrated Communication Network becomes more predominant, steps must be taken to safeguard it from malicious action. It is also imperative that forces can operate in a fall back mode without the network, if required of t