The foregoing is argued to beget mistrust between the two parties, particularly from the shareholders (employers). Consequently, the mistrust increases the inclination of enhanced monitoring of the agents’ (directors and managers) activities. Upon the foregoing principle lies the foundation of auditing profession (Millichamp & Taylor, 2008). The theory further expounds on the principle agent problem, that is, agency dilemma. The dilemma is said to be occasioned by the inclination of the agent’s inclination to act in his own best interest rather than those of the principal. There is a likelihood of moral hazard and conflict of interest arising in the corporate scene.

It is exemplified that, the principal (shareholders) may be sufficiently concerned that at the likelihood of being exploited by the agent (directors and managers) that a dilemma may arise in hiring the right agents. The foregoing is necessitated by the desire to minimize or get rid of agency costs (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). According to Adams (1994), the agency theory can provide for richer and more meaningful research in the internal audit discipline. Agency theory contends that internal auditing, in common with other intervention mechanisms like financial reporting and external audit, helps to maintain cost-efficient contracting between owners and managers.

Agency theory may not only help to explain the existence of internal audit in organizations but can also help explain some of the characteristics of the internal audit department, for example, its size, and the scope of its activities, such as financial versus operational auditing (Adams, 1994). Agency theory can be employed to test empirically whether cross-sectional variations between internal auditing practices reflect the different contracting relationships emanating from differences in organizational form.