V. Conclusion

In this case of Texarkana v. Planned Parenthood, the state has the stronger argument regarding the ACA’s “fetal heartbeat standard.” The statute retains the constitutionality ruling of the right to privacy defined in Roe. It simply modifies the outdated and subjective point of viability with the new medical technology. The trimester framework has no constitutional basis and should be subject to change with advancements in technology. Regarding the “health exception,” Planned Parenthood holds the stronger argument. It is completely subjective for the State to consider the physical factor of the “health exception” to be the most importance. The other factors may hold substantial weight regarding women’s health and is not up to the court to decide. The affirmation of undue burden is crucial if considering abortion to be a fundamental right found in the 14th Amendment. It allows for complete protection of the right from states’ unlawful regulations.

Part B:
6.
Law is inherently based in the moral convictions of society. These convictions however are subject to change throughout time. It is an agreed upon notion that the moral standard of the United States is much different than it was fifty years ago. It is this evolution that gives the marriage between law and morality its justification. The concept of doing away with public morality is fundamentally flawed considering, agreed upon values and norms dictate the legal codes of society. These laws are ultimately a social contract affirmed by society and are susceptible to changes as the moral environment of society changes.
Although morality may not be as objective as science, it does not mean it is an incapable way of determining law. First I would argue that doing away with morality in law is an impossible task. Morality is the foundation of every law and its validity. There is no law that is not based in some conception of right and wrong. Even the most agreed upon laws such as the prohibition of statutory rape are grounded in morals. Although statutory would be considered a part of privacy jurisprudence, there is no reasonable judge that would consider this to be a freedom that is being infringed upon. It is for this reason there is no method for detachment between morality and law.
I would also argue that although morality is not objective, it is fluid and this fluidity eliminates the need for objectivity. The idea of what is right and what is wrong in society is ever changing. Privacy rulings such as Roe and Griswold are not technically doing away with public morality, they are just portraying the current