The second test to the case is named the Robot Reply. We are approached to envision a PC put inside a robot. The PC goes about as a working cerebrum, while a camera permits the robot to ‘see,’ and connected arms and legs would permit the robot to move about. This robot’s PC cerebrum wouldn’t only control images to create yield, yet it would permit the robot to eat, drink, and do other human-like things. It is contended that this robot would have “certifiable comprehension.” Since people gain comprehension of words through encounters and associations with the rest of the world, it appears to be generally sensible that a robot would be able, as well. The robot answer reflects the Chinese room as in since it appears to be coherent a robot can acquire understanding and join importance to words, the individual in the room who communicates with the climate would have the option to make this equivalent comprehension. Searle answers to this complaint by saying the robot’s common association is essentially language structure and no semantics. He offers a bend on the complaint, and requests that we envision the Chinese room being put inside the robot rather than a PC. The Chinese images the individual controls and gives out will mechanize the robot’s arms and legs. The individual has no clue about the thing he is doing by any means, and the robot is just moving a direct result of its wiring and programming. Since the individual is the one conveying these messages to the engine, the robot has “no purposeful states.”

The last complaint I will address is the Brain Simulator Reply. This protest proposes the possibility that the Chinese room is comparable to a mind and could repeat the specific neuron firings and cerebrum working as a local Chinese speaker. All in all, the machine can reproduce the reactions a cerebrum would. Since the cerebrum and the room are hypothetically working the same way, this answer raises the problem that assuming we reject that the machine has had the option to comprehend the language, we would likewise need to deny the local Chinese speaker having any comprehension of the language. Searle answers that this reaction doesn’t infer understanding. He raises the water pipe model, where it is made sense of that specific calves need to