Additionally, in Re Lohnro the judge held that the in order to determine whether proceedings will be prejudiced by a publication on must look at ‘whether the publication will bring influence to bear which is likely to diver the proceedings in some way from the course which they would otherwise have followed.’ Furthermore, it was held that a ‘substantial risk’ did not mean that one must prove that the course of justice was actually prejudiced, there only needs to be a risk of serious prejudice.

In AG v MGN, Schiemann LJ created ten principles for the application of the strict liability rule, and especially the serious risk of impediment and prejudice. There are no clear rules which determine what types of cases are allowed to be published during active proceedings. Therefore, ‘each case must be decided on its own facts.’ Moreover, each publication is to be assessed separately and they must test the matter as they are at the time of publication. Also, the proceedings in question must be at risk of being impeded or prejudiced as a result of the publication. This risk has to be substantial in a way that the proceedings will ‘not only be impeded or prejudiced but seriously so.’ Substantial has been made out to mean ‘not remote’ or ‘not insubstantial’ and the risk has to be practical rather than theoretical. Furthermore, the publication must have created a risk which has created such a serious effect on the course of justice. In this case courts have made out that serious should have its regular English meaning.

Schiemann LJ named three matters that must be taken into account when assessing whether there is a substantial risk of prejudice due to the publication; one first has to look at the ‘likelihood of the publication coming to the attention of a potential juror’. When assessing this matter the judge will look at the area in which the publication circulates, whether this is an area where it is likely that jurors will be drawn, and they will have to lo