pp101-107) The extent to which this can be considered a mass atrocity can be measured by the UN’s response. This UN response came rapidly on the 26th of February 2011, just three days after the conflict began, as the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1970. The resolution expressed a “grave concern for the situation in Libya,” at the “gross and systematic violation of human rights,” crucially it is also explicit in calling upon the Libyan authorities for their “responsibility to protect its population,” and the need to “respect the freedoms of peaceful assembly.” (UN, n.d) Resolution 1970 also imposed sanctions upon the Libyan state such as the freezing of economic resources on Libyan territory. This action was reinforced by the UN adoption of resolution 1973 on March 17th 2011, which “reiterated responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population,” and that all armed parties within the conflict “take all feasible steps to protect civilians,” yet again reaffirming language of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. In addition resolution 1973 called for an immediate ceasefire and a no-fly zone over Libya. Two days after this resolution a NATO-led coalition force began bombing governmental forces which resulted in a military victory for the NATO coalition. The extent to which this is seen as an appropriate use of R2P however is debated. A realist concept that whilst a primary objective of the mandate in Libya was ‘civilian protection’, this changed over the course of the conflict towards regime change, a goal which is unlikely to have had the uncontested support of the Security Council. (Abomo 2018, p244) The opposition to this is put forward by Amstutz, who argues that the principal goal of the intervention was to “prevent the slaughter of civilians” in support of the R2P doctrine, as a result of this aim and the military intervention to achieve it, “the downfall of a lunatic,” was necessary.(Amstutz 2018, p161) This is an argument I would tend to concur with as, in my view, the Libyan government failed in its responsibility to protect its citizens, and whilst regime change came as a result of necessary humanitarian intervention, the principal goal was the protection of human rights. A further argument which is made against the intervention in Libya is one which is also levelled against the concept of the R2P doctrine itself, whether it indeed unacceptably breaches a level of sovereignty. In a polemic article regarding Libyan intervention, Keeler argues “it seemed clear that for many politicians, humanitarian intervention has become no more than an inappropriate violation of national sovereignty.” (Keeler, 2011) However, the question still remains at what point does national sovereignty have to be breached to protect human rights? In this case,