Sample Solution
In Seamons v. Snow (2009), the Supreme Court of Utah considered a challenge to a state law that allowed schools to deny enrollment based on religious affiliation. The plaintiffs, two students from a Mormon background, had been denied admission to school by a private Christian school because of their faith. They argued that this violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
The court found in favor of the school, holding that there is no violation of either clause when it comes to religiously-affiliated schools denying admission based on religion. It reasoned that such schools have an interest in preserving their religious character and mission, which allows them to limit access accordingly without violating constitutional protections against discrimination.
In its ruling, the court noted that “public education is not [the] exclusive province” of government; rather, private institutions offering similar educational opportunities are also constitutionally protected in making decisions regarding student admissions (Seamons v Snow 2009). As such, it found no violation occurred here since allowing all applicants regardless would go against the aims and values espoused by religiously-affiliated schools.
Overall then, Seamons v Snow established that privately owned and operated religious schools may deny students admission for reasons related to religious belief provided such action does not breach existing anti-discrimination laws . By recognizing this right as expressed through applicable First Amendment clauses ,the court clarified how institutions balancing secular interests with those relating faith can remain distinct yet compliant with legal requirements .
First, it is never just to intentionally kill innocent people in wars, supported by Vittola’s first proposition. This is widely accepted as ‘all people have a right not to be killed’ and if a soldier does, they have violated that right and lost their right. This is further supported by “non-combatant immunity” (Frowe (2011), Page 151), which leads to the question of combatant qualification mentioned later in the essay. This is corroborated by the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, ending the Second World War, where millions were intently killed, just to secure the aim of war. However, sometimes civilians are accidentally killed through wars to achieve their goal of peace and security. This is supported by Vittola, who implies proportionality again to justify action: ‘care must be taken where evil doesn’t outweigh the possible benefits (Begby et al (2006b), Page 325).’ This is further supported by Frowe who explains it is lawful to unintentionally kill, whenever the combatant has full knowledge of his actions and seeks to complete his aim, but it would come at a cost. However, this does not hide the fact the unintended still killed innocent people, showing immorality in their actions. Thus, it depends again on proportionality as Thomson argues (Frowe (2011), Page 141).
This leads to question of what qualifies to be a combatant, and whether it is lawful to kill each other as combatants. Combatants are people who are involved directly or indirectly with the war and it is lawful to kill ‘to shelter the innocent from harm…punish evildoers (Begby et al (2006b), Page 290).However, as mentioned above civilian cannot be harmed, showing combatants as the only legitimate targets, another condition of jus in bello, as ‘we may not use the sword against those who have not harmed us (Begby et al (2006b), Page 314).’ In addition, Frowe suggested combatants must be identified as combatants, to avoid the presence of guerrilla warfare which can end up in a higher death count, for example, the Vietnam War. Moreover, he argued they must be part of the army, bear arms and apply to the rules of jus in bello. (Frowe (2011), Page 101-3). This suggests Frowe seeks a fair, just war between two participants avoiding non-combatant deaths, but wouldn’t this lead to higher death rate for combatants, as both sides have relatively equal chance to win since both use similar tactics? Nevertheless, arguably Frowe will argue that combatant can lawfully kill each other, showing this is just, which is also supported by Vittola, who states: ‘it is lawful to draw the sword and use it against malefactors (Begby et al (2006b), Page 309).’
In addition, Vittola expresses the extent of military tactics used, but never reaches a conclusion whether it’s lawful or not to proceed these actions, as he constantly found a middle ground, where it can be lawful to do such things but never always (Begby et al (2006b), Page 326-31). This is supported by Frowe, who measures the legitimate tactics according to proportionality and military necessity. It depends on the magnitude of how much damage done to one another, in order to judge the actions after a war. For example, one cannot simply nuke the terrorist groups throughout the middle-east, because it is not only proportional, it will damage the whole population, an unintended consequence. More importantly, the soldiers must
