ith (1999) observation on whether becoming a member state to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its Optional Protocol had an impact on the state’s behaviour led to interesting results. Her study was conducted on 178 countries across an eighteen-year period from 1976-1993. Findings led to the conclusion that despite ratification of the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol, there was no significant difference in behaviour from states before and after becoming state parties to the conventions. Accordingly, regardless of whether states have ratified a legally binding convention, it does not necessarily mean they are willing to oblige. This is alarming as often states that sign Optional Protocol’s generally show an improvement in their human rights performance as it suggests a ‘thick commitment’ to human rights (Hill, 2010; Cole 2012). This is due to the fact the Optional Protocol allows for an individual complaints procedure which would insinuate its commitment to the relevant human rights instrument. It may, therefore, be overly optimistic to presume that being a party to an international instrument will have a significant impact on states behaviour. This supports many scholars who suggest that international mechanisms are inherently weak and that they only serve a promotional or socialising function instead of a tool that promotes rights (Donnelly, 1989; Forsythe, 1991; Opsahl, 1995; Robertson, 1981). States are able to recognise these weaknesses which may encourage them to ratify international covenants as there is less of a threat to their sovereignty or their continuation of policies that may violate individual rights. Their ratification is thus merely a public relation stunt rather than a way to show their policies are changing in terms of ensuring human rights are promoted and protected. Political science has thus highlighted that although law attempts to improve states obligation to human rights, it does not necessarily work on the ground. However, what the study did take into consideration were the domestic situations that may face the state itself which has interfered with their commitment or lessens their will to keep up with their obligation e.g. national and non-international armed conflict. Studies have suggested that domestic threats have increased the probability of state repression due to its interference with good governance (Alfatooni and Allen, 1991; Davenport, 1995, Poe et al., 1996, 1997). International armed conflict is another serious threat which often compels regimes to resort to political oppression in order to ensure domestic order is intact throughout a state of emergency (Gurr, 1986). With the various international and non-international conflict