ly on formal operations and follow syntactical rules for their internal manipulation, Searle (1990) states that the syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics. So the connectionists focus learning from environmental stimuli and storing information in connections between neurons.

Picard (1997) defined emotions in artificial intelligence as “Affective computing relates to, arises from or deliberately influences emotions”. Projects have been based off this, for example the Kismet project. The kismet project can express emotions through facial expressions and carry out social interactions (Brezeal, 2002). Kismet has a cognitive system consisting of perception, attention, basic drives and behaviour. Trevarthen, 1979 found that the expressive cues used by Kismet are effective only at regulating affective and intersubjective interactions. Sloman & Croucher, 1981. Argued that in realistic robots, human emotions will emerge from various types of interaction between different mechanisms not from a dedicated mechanism for emotion which differs from (James, 1890 and Damasio. 1994) who claim that emotions are developed by sensing patterns in a psychological state, for example, blood pressure, hormones. However, Fellous and Arbib, (p.239) argues that if a robot was to tell you in great detail why it is upset you will be more likely to believe it has emotions than if it only shows tears or shaking its head in response. However, there has been previous arguments that emotions are independent because their emergence does not require or reduce to cognitive processes (Ackerman, Abe, & Izard, 1998) Kismet also contains a programme called facesense which is used as a training tool for Autism. What Picard did not theorise was that there are large individual differences in human cognitive processes and their ability to recognise and portray emotions, for example, autism and Asperger’s syndrome, also downs syndrome are neurologically different regarding their emotions compared to neurotypical humans. Emotions are linked to making a human conscious, being aware of things. So how can a computer portray a conscience? There has been research into computers and conscience.

Consciousness and emotions are a main interest when developing computers, whether a conscious can be recreated. After completion of the Turing test, Alan Turing wrote “I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about consciousness… but I do not think these mysteries need to be solved before anyone can answer the question of whether machines can think.” However neuroscientists have theorised that consciousness is actually generated by various components of our brain, named as the neutral correlates of consciousness (Aleksander, 1995) However, Bickle, 2003 stated that consciousness can only be realised in physical human terms because consciousness has properties that fundamentally depend on humans. Consciousness has been a major cause of debate for cognitive scientists, Chalmers, 2011 in his article claimed that only the right kinds of computations are sufficient for the possession of a conscious mind. If a computer could be conscious, it would cause for ethical complications. “What if a computer was aware and conscious of what we was doing to them, there would have to be ethical rules in place.” (Franklin, 2001) In Meji University in Japan, Junichi Takeno is investigating self-awareness in robots, he has asserted that he has developed a robot capable of discriminating between themselves in a mirror and an identical image of it (Takeno, Inaba and Suzuki, 2005). He also states that he constructed an artificial consciousness by forming relationships between emotions, feelings and reason by connecting the modules in a hierarchy (Igarashi, Takeno, 2007) Takeno proposed his SBT (Self body theory) by stating that humans feel their own mirror image is closer to themselves than an actual part of themselves. (Torigoe, Takeno, 2009)

Language is a complex task and it has been thought that although learning is motivated by social interaction from birth, which the process of learning words relies more on the computational ability of the human brain. (Hoff and Naigles, 2002) found that the more input of the maternal caregiver, the faster language was learnt. This found that toddlers learning of language was not related to the nature of social engagement between them and the mothers. Chomsky, 1968 argued that language was innate and is categorised into surface structure and deep structure, however Karmiloff and Karmiloff-Smith (2001) criticised his theory and stated that researchers need to take into account of each