his is also appropriate through Knill’s argument in that policy objectives and instruments are expected to undergo modifications during the implementation process, due to the casual relationship between means and ends that is present in an implementation process, unlike in the PAT where it merely regards the principal and agent to have bureaucratic form-follows-function, causal relationship. Hill & Hupe (2009) adds to the argument that discretion increases meaningfulness, which enhances the agent’s willingness to implement policy, and given that the agents are fairly experienced, they should be allowed professional discretion as a part of their choice and consideration. The PA theory overly regards agents as individuals that seek personal benefit, and does not take into account enough the agents’ expertise (i.e. from local knowledge and experience) that they may utilize to focus on a different aspect of the policy impact, that diverges, or is conflicting, with that of the Principals’.

Implementation effectiveness varies across policy sectors; it can be argued how the PAT insufficiently takes into account the capacities of the agents in intervening and criticising their principals through divergence or non-compliance. This adds to how the PAT undermines the agents’ formal expertise and experience, which if continued, could result in these agents’ increasing policy alienation. The PAT’s top-down approach also systematically excludes the situational contexts the divergent agents are faced with on the street-level in times that they are required to make unforeseen decisions on the field. As policy implementation is – and should be – conducted alongside experiential knowledge and expertise in mind; creating, designing and implementing policy should thus be regarded as a bargaining process that both the agent and principal take part in, where utilizing both actors’ expertise will maximise the policy’s impact and outcome.