f we reduce our philosophy and theory of mind to one excluding mental, we deduct the importance of experience in understanding a phenomenon. Jackson explains that “mental states are inefficacious in respect to the physical world” (Jackson). Qualia only impact other mental states rather than physical states. Jackson reiterates this by providing three reasons. The first being causality. Just because A follows B does not mean B can follow A. The B follows A hypothesis can be refuted by proving there is a common underlying causal process for each distinct effect. Second, Jackson uses evolution to prove his dualism. Polar bears have evolved to have a thick coat. This thickness makes the coat heavy. Thus, the polar bears experience what it is like to carry a heavy coat. This is clearly not conducive to survival. Therefore, from Darwin’s Theory we know that any evolved characteristics are either conducive to survival or a by-product of an evolutionary action that is conducive to survival. Jackson uses this support his argument against physicalism: “qualia are a by-product of certain brain processes that are conducive to survival” (Jackson). Third, Jackson emphasizes the relationships between how we know our minds through behavior. We only know about others’ minds through observing their behavior. So, we must ask: how can a person’s behavior accurately reflect that he has qualia unless they conclude that behavior is an outcome of qualia? This gives rise to the main weakness of Jackson’s view – there is no proper evidence for the refutation of epiphenomenal qualia. Another weakness of Jackson’s view is the lack of clarity of source. Where do these qualia come from? If not physical, then where? This brings into questions spirits and “upper powers,” such as God, the existence of which are heavily debated in the scientific community. Despite this, the validity of dualism (and the lack of proving dualism to be incorrect), is a strong argument and will continue to allow Jackson’s argument to be considered valid.

Because Jackson clearly refutes any existence of physicalism in his explanation of phenomenal q