shirk their ‘Responsibility to Protect’, the mandate of the United Nations operation in Cote D’Ivoire (UNOCI) was extended by passing resolution 1962. This resolution urged all parties to accept the UN’s review suggesting Ouattara’s election victory, it also weakened Gbagbo’s power by comprehensively freezing his assets in a similar manner to the Libyan conflict. (Daddieh 2016, p151) On January 19th, 2011 the UN Security Council enhanced measures against Gbagbo by unanimously voting to send in an additional 2000 UNOCI forces into the country. Sanctions were augmented by the UN through the passing of resolution 1975 on the 30th of March 2011, which urged Gbagbo to “step aside,” and supported the UNOCI in using “all means necessary,” to protect civilian life. (UN 2011) Gbagbo was arrested in April 2011 putting an end to the conflict. The impact of R2P would seem clear here as, simply without its concept, whilst one can only assume, the violent trajectory of the conflict would infer that there was a real possibility for mass atrocity. In this sense not only did R2P play a key role in shaping and alleviating the conflict, but also was vital in preventing greater human tragedy and protecting human rights.

R2P has not been unilaterally successful in its application within recent African conflict, however. Indeed Hilpold argues that in Darfur, the DRC and Yemen the concept of R2P has only been applied in an abstract fashion by using new terminology without greatly affecting the decisions made by the international community. (Hillpold 2014, p242) Darfur is a clear demonstration of how the rhetoric of R2P has far outweighed action taken on the ground. Darfur is a conflict which has taken the lives of nearly 300,000 people and displaced a further 2.7 million. (BBC, 2010) In comparison to both the Lybian and Ivorian conflicts, both death toll and population displacement would appear to constitute ‘mass atrocity’. It would appear, therefore, that the UN and the international community has failed to protect the citizens of Darfur in an appropriate manner. It would be unfair to say that the UN has not taken action as the UN and African Union has established a 26,000 personnel strong mission for the alleviation of the conflict in Sudan. (ICRtoP, n.d) Between 2007 and 2012 their mandate was extended 4 times however each mandate affirms the UN’s “determination to work with the Government of Sudan, in full respect of its sovereignty.” (Ibid) This would seem to clarify why there has been no direct military action to resolve the conflict, however, this highlights a major criticism levelled at R2P Protect regarding 21st-century African conflict, why is it deemed acceptable to breach national sovereignty in some cases but not others which could be deemed as a greater humanitarian threat? In a generalised sense the literature can be summarised as treating “Darfur and R2P as coterminous with failure” with “inaction underscoring its limitations to protect civilian populations.” (Verhoeven and Jaganathan 2015, pp21-37) I believe, however, it is difficult to analyse R2P as one concept across 21st-century African conflict as a whole. I would argue that the manner in which R2P is applied has to be considered through the spectrum of the conflict itself. Both Libya and Cote D’Ivoire represented conflicts which were both time sensitive and feasibly resolvable with military action, in the eyes of the international community. Conversely, Sudan, represented a hugely co